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ABSTRACT 
Awareness of human trafficking is increasing. This thesis aims to deepen our 
understanding of why traffickers prefer some countries over others as destination 
countries for their victims. Existing studies tend to neglect two elements when 
researching international human trafficking: factors that appeal to traffickers themselves 
and the significance of the country’s role in the international network as a destination 
country (rather than a source or transit country). In this thesis, I demonstrate that drug 
trafficking flows, legalized prostitution, and higher levels of corruption will appeal to 
traffickers and make countries more likely to be destination countries. I test this using 
data on human trafficking flows for 83 countries from 2006 to 2010 and find evidence of 
drug trafficking’s impact, mixed support for my hypothesis concerning prostitution, and 
limited  support for my hypothesis concerning corruption. These findings have important 
implications for those attempting to combat international human trafficking. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Recent years have seen an increase in international concern about human 
trafficking—for good reason. Human trafficking refers to the exploitation of victims, 
usually in the form of forced labor or sexual services, that strips vulnerable individuals of 
the ability to make decisions about their own lives. Human trafficking’s pernicious 
effects touch entire countries as well as individual lives. When it exists within a country 
in any form, trafficking damages the country’s ability to care for its own citizens and, to 
the extent that citizens are aware of these problems, weakens a government’s legitimacy 
by causing citizens to question their government’s ability to stem crime and protect 
human rights. After all, human trafficking represents a deeply personal violation of 
human rights. Its inherently abusive and exploitative nature strips victims of agency and 
extracts something from them against their will. By limiting victims’ choices and 
freedoms, trafficking also robs them of opportunity for healthy relationships, higher 
education, and other facets of a normal life. Of the different types of human trafficking, 
sex trafficking in particular can result in physical and psychological trauma as well as 
disease, pregnancy, and social rejection. In international cases, trafficking forcibly 
removes victims from the familiar and thrusts them into a dangerous unknown. 
Yet, current research on international trafficking mainly focuses on what causes 
individual victims to leave their homes, source countries, which represent only part of the 
international network of countries (Aronowitz, 2001; Bernat and Zhilina, 2010; 
Studnicka, 2010). Less is known about what causes traffickers to move victims to 
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destination countries, yet traffickers are the primary decision-makers and research should 
what factors matter to traffickers. This thesis seeks to fill that gap by controlling for 
wealth and development to identify what other institutional-level variables explain 
whether a country serves as a destination country in the international trafficking network. 
Human trafficking exists in many different forms. The best known are sexual and 
labor exploitation. The U.N. Global Report on Trafficking in Humans found that, as of 
2014, sexual exploitation made up 54% of trafficking cases while forced labor made up 
38%. However, human trafficking can also involve organ removal or forced military 
service. At its simplest, human trafficking is exploitation. Contrary to a common 
misconception, a victim of human trafficking need not be transported from one location 
to another; exploitation is sufficient to qualify as trafficking without physical travel. 
Cases where victims never leave their country of origin are considered internal 
trafficking. However, because I focus on destination countries where a victim is brought 
to one country from another, this thesis only considers international trafficking—victims 
transported into another country for any of six types of exploitation: prostitution, labor, 
debt bondage, domestic servitude, child prostitution, or child labor. 
Estimates in 2016 held that 40.3 million people were victims of modern slavery at 
any given time (International Labor Organization, 2016; hereafter ILO). Women and girls 
make up 99% of victims of sexual exploitation and 58% of victims in other sectors of 
forced labor. Though most victims are between 18 and 24 years of age, one in four 
victims are children, and almost half of those are between only 5 and 11 years of age. Of 
forced labor victims, boys make up 58%; of hazardous labor victims, boys make up 62%. 
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The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime reports that international human 
trafficking somehow involves every country in the world as a source, transit, or 
destination country with children comprising 28% of victims worldwide trafficked each 
year amongst these countries (2016). As of 2016, forced labor (primarily commercial 
sexual exploitation but also forced economic exploitation) generated 150 billion U.S. 
dollars annually—primarily in the Asia-Pacific region (generating 51.8 billion) and 
developed economies (46.9 billion) (ILO, 2016). Per region, the most wealth generated 
per victim occurred in developed economies (34.8 thousand in U.S. dollars) followed by 
the Middle East (15 thousand in U.S. dollars) (ILO, 2016). Of profits per victim per type 
of exploitation, sexual exploitation dwarfed the others: a single victim of sex trafficking 
generated 21.8 thousand U.S. dollars annually; the next closest was a victim forced into 
construction, manufacturing, mining, and utilities (generating 4.8 thousand U.S. dollars) 
(ILO, 2016). 
Several types of actors facilitate the exploitation of victims throughout the various 
processes of human trafficking. For instance, in cases of sexual exploitation, pimps and 
johns both exploit victims, albeit in different ways. The pimp exploits the victim for 
profit; the john exploits the victim for sexual gratification. Other perpetrators might 
engage in “seasoning” victims (to use a term of sex trafficking) by breaking down the 
victim on behalf of the pimp or owner; still others are those who first sell targeted 
individuals to pimps. If traffickers are part of a criminal organization, their greater 
resources allow them to traffic victims more effectively across greater distances. Others, 
such as corrupt law enforcement officers, judges, and politicians, enable trafficking to 
persist though they may not be involved directly. Criminal organizations might identify 
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corrupt officials within an otherwise legitimate government, actively corrupt officials by 
use of their own resources, or, in fractured governments, build their own corrupt system. 
Some organizations involved with human trafficking were also initially engaged in drug 
trafficking, which motivated them to intentionally corrupt officials in the first place 
(Shelley, 2012). 
Despite stereotypical portrayals in film, traffickers do not always, or even usually, 
use violent kidnapping to secure victims. Instead, victims or victims’ guardians fall prey 
to false promises of a better life (Aronowitz, 2001; Hughes and Denisova, 2001; Bernat 
and Zhilina, 2010). This requires that there be something less than ideal about the 
victim’s life, that the victim sees the false promise as plausible, and that the trafficker has 
the motivation to deceive the victim in the first place. In cases of international human 
trafficking, the trafficker must also have a reason to want to move the victim to another 
country. Despite abundant research on the scope of human poverty and methods of 
coercion and deception used by traffickers, human trafficking research tends to neglect 
the variable reasons why traffickers would invest the resources necessary to move victims 
from one country to another. 
Current research on human trafficking focuses on push and pull factors that 
determine trafficking flows, but that picture is incomplete. Push factors (such as poverty 
and lack of jobs) “push” victims from their homes and pull factors (strong economies, 
glamor) “pull” victims to destination countries. Pull factors, however, tend to consist 
primarily of characteristics of destination countries that appeal to individual victims—an 
already vulnerable victim might find the allure of the relative wealth and allure of the 
United States more difficult to ignore than an offer to move to a poorer country. Yet, 
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despite the validity of such pull factors, the limited scope excludes other relevant factors. 
After all, victims are not the only actors. 
What institutional differences draw traffickers to one country rather than another? 
What enables pimps or labor exploiters to set up shop in a given community? In cases of 
sexual exploitation, what encourages johns to spend the money and bear the risks 
involved with using prostitutes in one territory rather than another? This thesis seeks to 
investigate the factors that matter to traffickers as they bring victims to destination 
countries. 
Researchers need to better understand what factors make a destination country 
attractive to traffickers for two reasons. First, researchers can use this knowledge to 
identify trends and, thereby, predict increases of human trafficking instances in 
destination countries. Second, researchers can educate other actors intending to combat 
human trafficking on better ways to discourage traffickers. After all, no politician would 
agree to trying to reduce a country’s appeal in general, but they might agree to methods 
to reduce a country’s appeal to the criminals involved in trafficking.  
Of course, reducing the number of destination countries would not eradicate 
trafficking entirely. However, internationally trafficked victims face unique dangers and 
challenges and the destination countries themselves suffer from the trafficking that 
crosses their borders. Specifically attacking destination countries, while not an endeavor 
to be undertaken at the exclusion of other efforts, would ultimately shield victims from 
some though not all results of trafficking while simultaneously creating safer countries 
with greater legitimacy. 
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To investigate what factors encourage traffickers to use a given country as a 
destination country, I consider 83 countries from different regions of the world from 2006 
to 2010, using seven probit models to account for the different types of human 
trafficking. My primary independent variables are drug trafficking flows, legality of 
prostitution, and corruption. I consider drug trafficking flows and legality of prostitution 
because they tend to be neglected in quantitative research on human trafficking. I also 
consider corruption. Other studies have investigated corruption’s impact on human 
trafficking in general, but I want to know if corruption has a unique impact on destination 
countries in particular. I find that drug trafficking flows seem to mirror human trafficking 
flows (destination and transit countries for drugs are more likely to be destination 
countries for human trafficking), but legality of prostitution has a mixed effect and 
corruption has the opposite effect (less corrupt countries are more likely to be destination 
countries for domestic servitude). 
This thesis is organized as follows: I first explore what previous research has to 
say about human trafficking, highlighting the key elements and different types of human 
trafficking and pull factors identified by other researchers. I then perform 7 probit models 
to identify which of those factors predict whether countries serve as destination countries 
for different types of human trafficking. After discussing the implications of my results 
and limitations of the analysis, I perform qualitative analysis of several countries to 
examine the application of my hypotheses in real cases. I conclude with a summary of my 
thesis and a discussion of future research directions. 
 
7 
CHAPTER ONE: UNDERSTANDING HUMAN TRAFFICKING 
Literature 
Research on international trafficking often identifies push and pull factors, which 
is a step in the right direction, but the push and pull factors tested in quantitative analyses 
are typically only most significant matter to victims, thus neglecting much of the broader 
context in which victims are trafficked. Commonly recognized pull factors include “high 
levels of labor demand, higher wages, many job opportunities, and the perceived glamour 
of the lifestyle in Western countries” (Demir and Finckenauer, 2010: 60). Note that all of 
these represent pull factors that would appeal to victims. Other research offers “the male 
population over the age of 60, governmental corruption, food production, energy 
consumption and infant mortality” as other pull factors (Aronowitz, 2001: 171). Note that 
the first two represent factors that would appeal to traffickers whereas the last two 
represent measures of development, a common pull factor from victims’ perspectives. 
Cho et al. (2013) found that countries with “higher GDP per capita, larger populations, 
larger stocks of pre-existing migrants, and a democratic political regime” are more likely 
to be destination countries (83). 
The trouble with focusing on victims-oriented factors at the expense of others is 
threefold. First, they represent only part of the picture, and perhaps a less relevant part at 
that. Traffickers, not victims, are the primary decision-makers, yet focusing on victims’ 
push and pull factors ignores factors that matter to traffickers. Second, victims-oriented 
factors may not accurately reflect reality—what victims perceive to be true of a 
8 
 
 
destination country may not actually be true (Bales, 2007). Finally, few countries would 
willingly reduce pull factors such as wealth, opportunity, and general quality-of-life 
appeal. After all, though traffickers know that “the higher the economic development of 
the destination country, the higher the price that will be paid for her” (Hughes and 
Denisova, 2001: 48), reducing economic development is not a feasible nor reasonable 
strategy to counteract trafficking. 
In light of this, I investigate factors that make countries more likely to be 
destination countries by attracting traffickers. I model my thesis largely off the work of 
Bales (2007), who sought to explain all forms of international trafficking involving an 
organized criminal group. Bales’ article sought to answer two questions: What are the 
strongest predictors of trafficking from a country on the global scale and what are the 
strongest predictors of trafficking to a country on the global scale? In my attempt to 
explain destination countries, I focus more on Bales’ approach to this second question. In 
addition to considering the relatively standard “perceived pull factors,” which tend to be 
victims-oriented, Bales also considered the “permeability” of borders (2007: 276). 
Lacking an estimate of permeability, Bales used several indicators, such as government 
corruption, that could increase border permeability. This begins to get at factors that 
attract traffickers. 
Bales used data from the United Nations statistical handbook on all the countries 
in the world to measure social, political, and economic factors. Concerning explanations 
of trafficking from a country, Bales found support for the commonly understood push 
factors (societal pressures, lack of opportunity, government corruption) and pull factors 
(economic development, demographic profiles, and government corruption); beyond that, 
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the analysis suggested that reducing corruption should be the first and most effective way 
to reduce trafficking” (2007: 276). Concerning explanations of trafficking to a country, 
the results found only four variables are significantly related to the estimate of trafficking 
to a country, and together they account for only 15.5% of the variation between 
countries” (2007: 276). The primary predictive variable is the percent of the male 
population over the age of 60, followed by government corruption, followed by various 
indicators of government capacity and size of the economy (infant mortality, food 
production, energy consumption per capita) (2007). 
More recently, Cho (2012) analyzed 180 countries from 1995 to 2010 to test 
different push and pull factors. Cho identified 67 potential pull factors from the literature 
to test; a series of regression analyses revealed a mix of significant factors: 
Percentage of workforce employed in agriculture (positive); refugee inflows 
(positive); (log)population size (positive); inflow of international tourists 
(positive); crime rates (positive); (log)amount of Heroin seized (positive); being 
an OECD member (positive); being an East Asian country (positive); being a 
land-locked country (negative); and percentage of Catholics in the total 
population (negative). (2012: 15) 
Some of these factors are victims-oriented and many are neutral, but some (international 
tourists, crime rates, heroin seized) would be relevant to traffickers. Interestingly, Cho 
found that despite the significance of crime indicators (crime rates, amount of heroin 
seized), law enforcement and institutional quality did not determine whether a country 
would be a destination country (2012). Cho suggests that this might be explained by 
countries with advanced law enforcement capabilities and institutions that nevertheless 
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fail to apply those capabilities and institutions directly to the problem of human 
trafficking. 
Surtees (2008) focused on understanding traffickers, though she limited her study 
to Southern and Eastern Europe and she took a qualitative rather than quantitative 
approach. She found that European traffickers are generally more organized than 
traffickers in South-East Asia, though the organizations remain loose rather than strictly 
hierarchical; traffickers in her study often managed multiple markets and routs, 
cooperating with other criminal groups (2016). She found that corruption was a crucial 
facilitator of human trafficking at several steps throughout the process—from border 
crossings to ignoring prostitution venues to dismissing criminal cases (2016). 
According to Gallagher and Holmes (2008), wealthier destination countries 
(countries from North America, Western Europe, Australia, and certain Middle Eastern 
and Asian countries) “bear the greatest legal and moral responsibility for responding to 
trafficking because it is in these countries that the real profits are made and the real 
exploitation takes place” (2008: 321). Given that developed economies as a group are 
second only to the Asia-Pacific region in dollars generated annually through human 
trafficking, the argument has merit. If the argument that the majority of exploitation takes 
place in destination countries also holds true, such destination countries are positioned to 
exert greater influence. Thus, failure on the part of destination countries to identify, 
protect, and support victims and victim witnesses through an effective criminal justice 
system will result in a greater negative impact; success, on the other hand, would play a 
more significant role. Explaining how traffickers select destination countries, as this 
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thesis seeks to do, is a first step towards making the world less hospitable to human 
traffickers. 
My first explanatory variable is drug trafficking. Drug trafficking plays a 
multifaceted role in human trafficking. Victims of trafficking may be used to smuggle 
drugs as part of forced labor (Cicero-Domínguez, 2005) or to pay for transportation to 
destination countries (Shelley, 2012). Addictive drugs given to victims compel 
individuals to perform sexual acts while stimulants enable laborers to work longer, harder 
hours (Shelley, 2012). Between the growing competition between drug trafficking 
groups, the extra focus of governments on drug trafficking rather than on human 
trafficking, and the relatively low entry costs of engaging in human trafficking (drug 
trafficking organizations can hide human trafficking within their other business ventures), 
criminal organizations typically begin trafficking drugs and expand to traffic individuals, 
rather than the other way around (Shelley, 2012). Drug traffickers often intentionally seek 
to corrupt government officials and such corruption further enables trafficking (Shelley, 
2012). 
Another potential variable influencing traffickers is the legality of prostitution. 
Though commercial sexual exploitation is only one form of human trafficking, it makes 
up the majority of cases. Prostitution remains controversial, with views split between the 
“sex work” approach to prostitution and the “neo-abolitionist” approach. The former 
generally separates prostitution from sex trafficking to focus on empowerment of 
vulnerable populations along with women’s rights, the rights of prostitutes, and legal 
rights between consenting adults (Carson and Edwards, 2011). The latter considers 
prostitution inherently exploitative, questions the legitimacy of consent given by 
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prostitutes, and views prostitution as a root cause of commercial sexual exploitation 
(Carson and Edwards, 2011). Traffickers can use societal shame and drug addiction to 
maintain victims in a state of bondage as prostitutes (Baker et al., 2010). Notably, even 
some of the “sex work” camp acknowledge that legitimacy of consent is frail due to 
power asymmetries between parties (Carson and Edwards, 2011). 
Theoretical arguments consistently fail to agree conclusively on the relationship 
between legal prostitution and commercial sexual exploitation. Hughes and Denisova 
(2001) investigated victims of commercial sexual exploitation from Ukraine. They found 
that “countries with legal or tolerated sex industries create the demand” and, thus, are 
more likely to be destination countries (43). Akee et al. (2014) tested the effect of 
legislation banning prostitution in both destination and source countries and found “both 
host and source country prostitution laws exert a positive and mutually reinforcing effect 
on international trafficking” (27). 
Cho et al. (2013) takes a quantitative approach to test two potential and very 
different theoretical effects of legalization of prostitution. The first, the scale effect, 
means that legalization of prostitution actually expands the prostitution market. The 
substitution effect, however, suggests that demand for prostitutes will favor legal 
prostitutes over illegal ones, thus reducing illicit activities related to prostitution. Their 
dependent variable was trafficking flows and their two primary explanatory variables 
were dummy variables capturing whether prostitution in a given country is legal and 
whether third party involvement is legal. They found that, controlling for regional and 
demographic factors and wealth, countries where prostitution is legal experience more 
inflows of human trafficking, indicating that the scale effect dominates the substitution 
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effect and suggesting that legalizing prostitution invites human trafficking (2013). Their 
second dummy variable, however, was insignificant, suggesting that general legislation 
matters more than specific legislation. 
Corruption is my third explanatory variable. It relates to both drug trafficking and 
legality of prostitution but should have an independent effect on trafficking as well due to 
its connection to organized crime in general. Though law enforcement can have a mixed 
effect by either deterring traffickers or raising the value of victims and thus enticing 
traffickers, the impact of criminal organizations and corruption is less ambiguous. 
Hughes and Denisova (2001) found that criminal organizations facilitate trafficking in 
part by encouraging corruption: the same criminal networks that keep databases about 
potential victims usually engage in other illicit activities, particularly drug trafficking. 
Corrupt officials, at minimum, ignore human trafficking, but they might also actively aid 
traffickers. Hughes and Denisova (2001) suggest that corruption plays larger roles in 
destination countries than in other countries as corrupt officials distributing authentic 
documents to traffickers (Hughes and Denisova, 2001). 
Though the literature consistently cites corruption as a cause of trafficking but 
typically fails to discuss whether corruption at different levels of government produces 
variation in outcomes as well as the variation associated with countries positions in the 
trafficking chain (destination countries as opposed to source and transit countries). A 
minority opinion holds that less corruption may be counterintuitively harmful for 
destination countries. Akee et al. (2014) focus on middleman traffickers’ response to 
buyers’ willingness to pay in both source and host countries—which is dependent upon 
likelihood of discovery and work stoppage in the respective countries. The authors of this 
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study assume that both domestic and foreign demand exists for human trafficking and 
that bargaining position of transnational traffickers hinges on their ability to switch 
between domestic trafficking and foreign trafficking. They consider the effects of 
focusing anti-trafficking efforts (victim protection programs and law enforcement against 
prostitution) in a single country, domestically, and find that if buyer demand is inelastic, 
an increase in the likelihood of discovery in destination countries increases inflow of 
victims by increasing the relative value of a victim in that location, thus raising buyers’ 
willingness to pay there. Though Akee et al. (2014) identify several policy combinations 
between destination and source countries that can hinder transnational flow of victims, 
they also discover that greater law enforcement in destination countries might result in an 
increase in the transnational flow of trafficked victims. With inelastic demands for 
buyers, greater law enforcement in destination countries “can raise the willingness to pay 
for trafficked victims in the host country, thus encouraging transnational trafficking” 
(29). 
Other factors worth noting are migrants, smuggling, and their connection to 
corruption and law enforcement. Unlike human trafficking, migration and smuggling do 
not necessarily involve exploitation and are less often involved with organized crime 
groups (Aronowitz, 2001). Nevertheless, if migrants struggle to find legal entry 
opportunities into other countries, they may turn to expanding, illegal migrant networks, 
where traffickers can easily find vulnerable individuals (Demir and Finckenauer, 2010). 
Power imbalances between travelers and those helping them can cause both migration 
and smuggling to result in exploitation. When migrants and smuggled individuals are 
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illegally brought into a new country, they are unable to turn to law enforcement if their 
circumstances become exploitative (Chacon, 2006). 
Hypotheses 
The research outlined above suggests that a number of factors influence whether a 
country is a destination country of human trafficking. In this paper, I focus on three 
hypotheses. First, the presence of organized crime with experience transporting illicit 
goods such as drugs into and through the country should enable traffickers to bring 
victims to that country. Organized crime groups build extensive criminal networks and 
intentionally corrupt government officials. Even though some of these groups don’t 
engage in human trafficking directly, they pave the way for human traffickers. 
Hypothesis 1: Drug Trafficking 
Transit and destination countries for illegal drugs are more likely to be 
destination countries for human trafficking. 
Second, countries where prostitution is completely legal might be more attractive 
as destination countries because it expands the market for prostituted individuals, 
including victims of forced prostitution. Legal prostitution also makes it easier for 
traffickers to create an image that victims are prostitutes by choice. 
Hypothesis 2: Legal Prostitution 
Countries with greater legal protections for prostitution are more likely to 
be destination countries. 
Finally, government corruption allows these traffickers to operate without 
obstruction. This is true of all countries that experience human trafficking, but I expect it 
to be especially true of destination countries. Corrupt governments are also less likely to 
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be either willing or able to advocate for victims. Therefore, countries with high levels of 
corruption would be more attractive to pimps, traffickers, and johns. This is particularly 
important for law enforcement, though all corrupt government officials can ignore human 
trafficking or even obstruct efforts to combat it. 
Hypothesis 3: Government Corruption 
Countries with high levels of government corruption are more likely to be 
destination countries. 
Understanding the effect of these three variables on destination countries of 
human trafficking will both allow researchers to better understand the problem of 
international trafficking itself and direct policymakers in how to craft more effective 
responses. I now test the results in two stages: first, I use statistical analysis to test for 
precise relationships between my independent and dependent variables; second, I 
consider how those results operate in the real world through a seven case studies. 
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CHAPTER TWO: STATISTICAL ANALYSIS  
Research Design 
Measures of human trafficking remain a challenge. First, despite the antiquity of 
the problem, it only recently gained scholarly attention; data in many areas prior to the 
1950s is elusive. This is exacerbated by different definitions between different countries; 
even if one country maintains data over a longer time, another country might use a 
different measure, making comparisons difficult. Even when countries use the same 
measures, the illicit nature of human trafficking naturally incentivizes actors to obscure 
its true extent. Data are often self-reported as well, so countries may have an incentive to 
misrepresent their criminal activity to the rest of the world. Finally, those who should 
measure trafficking, particularly law enforcement officers, might be tempted to ignore 
cases, especially when public officials are involved with sexual exploitation (Studnicka, 
2010: 31). Consequently, data on this subject are variant in definition, design, 
systematization, and quality. 
A thorough understanding of human trafficking requires comparisons across 
countries and through time. This allows researchers to reach more specific conclusions 
and understand competing claims to causation. For instance, a given factor might have 
great predictive power concerning internal trafficking but have little to do with whether 
the country will act as a host country to victims trafficked from abroad. Similarly, a few 
elements might largely explain trafficking within a certain timeframe but not so much in 
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another. Any factor that retains its explanatory power regardless of variance in country or 
time, however, deserves greater consideration. 
My research includes data from 83 countries from 2006 to 2010. I run seven 
probit regression models with dichotomous dependent variables taken from the Human 
Trafficking Indicators (HTI) dataset (Frank, 2013). My first dependent variable is a 
binary indicator as to whether a country is a “destination” country (General Destination), 
meaning that victims are transported across borders into that country where they remain 
during their exploitation. I then proceed to narrow the parameters for the subsequent 
dependent variables. My other dependent variables, also taken from the HTI dataset, are 
binary indicators as to whether a country is a destination country for the following: 
prostitution (Prostitution Destination), labor (Labor Destination), debt bondage (Debt 
Bondage Destination), domestic servitude (Domestic Servitude Destination), child 
prostitution (Child Prostitution Destination), and child labor (Child Labor Destination). 
Drawing from past qualitative and quantitative research, I consider several 
explanatory factors. My primary independent variables are illicit drug trafficking, the 
presence of government corruption, and the legality of prostitution. I measure drug 
trafficking with three dichotomous variables: a country’s status as a drug source (Drug 
Source), transit (Drug Transit), or destination (Drug Destination) country with data from 
the U.S. State Department’s International Narcotics Control Strategy Report published 
from 2006 to 2010. I use binary variables to indicate whether the report recognizes that 
drugs flow from, through, or to that country. Note that for simplicity and clarity, I do not 
code countries based on whether they traffic in precursors. I expect countries that 
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experience any type of drug flow are more likely to be destination countries of human 
trafficking. 
I measure legality of prostitution according to procon.org’s assessment of 100 
countries’ prostitution policies. Procon.org collected data from the CIA World Factbook 
in 2009 and coded for each country whether brothel ownership (Brothel) and pimping 
(Pimping) were illegal, partially legal, or legal. I code illegality as 0, partial legality as 1, 
and complete legality as 2. To develop time series data, I investigated whether each 
country passed new laws related to prostitution, brothel ownership, and pimping from 
2006 to 2009 and in 2010 and adjusted the coding accordingly. I expect countries with 
higher scores (greater legality) of prostitution to be more likely to be destination 
countries. Of note, procon.org’s coding also codes countries for legality of prostitution 
itself, but the coding for prostitution is ambiguous. A number of different policies could 
cause a country to receive a score of “partially legal” prostitution—one country might 
criminalize some but not all forms of prostitution; another might criminalize the buying 
but not selling of acts related to prostitution. Furthermore, this variable was highly 
correlated with brothel legality. Therefore, although Cho et al. (2013) found legality of 
prostitution significant and legality of brothels and pimping insignificant, I focus on 
legality of brothels and pimping in my main analysis and include prostitution’s legality in 
a separate robustness test. 
Corruption was difficult to measure. I took several different approaches. 
Primarily, I used the commonly-used Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) (2006-2010) 
from Transparency International (2017). The CPI uses surveys and expert validation to 
rank countries on a scale of 100 (not corrupt) to 0 (very corrupt). In a separate robustness 
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test, I used the Human Rights and Rule of Law from fundforpeace.org’s Fragile State 
Index (FSI) (2006-2010). The index uses three streams of data—quantitative, qualitative, 
and expert validation—to arrive at a country’s score. The Human Rights and Rule of Law 
indicator (HR) measures freedom of press, judicial independence, military corruption, 
political repression, political violence, denial of due process, and current or emerging 
undemocratic rule. Countries with higher scores for each of the indices are more fragile; 
thus, I expect countries with higher scores to be more likely to be destination countries. 
I include seven control variables for several legal, political, and socioeconomic 
factors. First, I control for levels of democracy with the Polity index (Polity), ranging 
from -10 (undemocratic) to 10 (democratic) (Polity, 2016); I expect high Polity scores to 
make a country more likely to be a destination country. I then control for whether the 
country has domestic laws that specifically target human trafficking (Domestic Laws) and 
whether those laws are actually enforced (Enforce); I use data provided by HTI where 
countries receive scores from 0 to 2 indicating no, partial, or full laws and no, partial, or 
full enforcement. I expect both of these variables to negatively associate with destination 
countries. I also control for infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births) (Infant Mortality) 
and logged tourism receipts (Tourism) as measures of development. I operationalize these 
factors with data from the World Development Indicators (WDI) from worldbank.org 
(2006-2010) with the expectation that infant mortality and tourism receipts will positively 
associate with destination countries (the World Bank, 2017). Finally, I use two measures 
from the Fragile Countries Index (FSI) to capture country stability. The index includes 
twelve measures, but after excluding Economic Decline (which also measured illicit 
trafficking such as that of drugs and people), I still found that Security Apparatus 
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(Security) and Factionalized Elites (Elites) were highly correlated to the remaining 
indicators, so I used just those two to capture the effects of the index. Because higher 
scores indicate more fragility, I expect higher levels of Security and Elites to make a 
country less likely to be a destination country. Table 1 displays the summary statistics for 
the number of observations (N), the mean, the standard deviation (SD), the minimum 
(Min), and the maximum (Max). 
Table 1. Summary Statistics 
 N Mean SD Min Max 
Dependent      
General Destination 415 0.83615 0.37059 0 1 
Prostitution 
Destination 
415 0.78554 0.41094 0 1 
Labor Destination 415 0.66024 0.4742 0 1 
Debt Bondage 
Destination 
415 0.11807 0.32308 0 1 
Domestic Servitude 
Destination  
415 0.19277 0.39495 0 1 
Child Prostitution 
Destination 
415 0.58313 0.49364 0 1 
Child Labor 
Destination 
415 0.41928 0.49404 0 1 
Independent 
     
Drug Destination 415 0.31566 0.46534 0 1 
Drug Transit 415 0.70121 0.45828 0 1 
Drug Source 415 0.21446 0.41094 0 1 
Brothel 415 0.48193 0.84215 0 2 
Pimping 415 0.15663 0.52663 0 2 
CPI 415 6.72263 2.33756 1.5 9.6 
Polity 415 1.41446 4.7309 -10 10 
Domestic Laws 415 1.41205 0.5077 0 2 
Enforce 415 1.41205 0.607 0 2 
Infant Mortality 415 17.6152 17.8622 2.2 96.3 
Tourism 415 21.8847 1.69372 16.3004 25.8472 
Security 415 2.52782 2.52782 0.9 10 
Elites 415 4.86568 4.86568 0.7 89 
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Results 
Table 2 displays the results of the probit model for each of the seven dependent 
variables. Most of my variables performed as expected, although their significance varied 
from model to model. Destination and transit countries for drug trafficking generally 
make countries more likely to be destination countries for human trafficking. Drug 
Destination increases likelihood of a country being a destination for human trafficking in 
general and for prostitution in particular while Drug Transit makes a country more likely 
to be a destination for child prostitution and child labor trafficking. Interestingly, source 
countries for drug trafficking are less likely to be destination countries for human 
trafficking (Drug Source negatively associated with general destination and labor 
destination). This suggests that trafficking flows of humans somewhat mirrors trafficking 
flows of drugs, supporting Hypothesis 1. 
My primary prostitution-related variables produced interesting results. Increasing 
the legality of brothels made countries more likely to be destination countries for 
domestic servitude and child prostitution but less likely to be destination countries for 
debt bondage. Increasing the legality of pimping made countries less likely to be 
destination countries for prostitution, labor, and domestic servitude but more likely to be 
a destination country for debt bondage. This offers mixed support for Hypothesis 2, 
which predicted that increasing legality of all forms of prostitution would make a country 
more likely to be a destination country. I discuss possible explanations for these findings 
below. Overall, I believe my results support the findings of Cho (2012) that legal 
prostitution increases inflows of human trafficking. 
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The Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) scores performed unexpectedly. CPI was 
only significant in one model—domestic servitude—but a higher CPI score made a 
country less likely to be a destination country. This was inconsistent with Hypothesis 3. 
Again, I discuss this more below. 
Table 2. Probit Analysis Results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 
General 
Dest 
Pros 
Dest 
Labor 
Dest 
Debt 
Bondage 
Dest 
Domestic 
Servitude 
Dest 
Child 
Prostitute 
Dest 
Child 
Labor 
Dest 
Drug 
Destination  1.620*** 0.758** 0.0517 0.47* 0.324 0.192 0.24 
 (3.75) (2.83) (0.30) (2.10) (1.76) (1.12) (1.45) 
Drug 
Transit 
 
0.169 
 
0.318 0.348* -0.778*** 0.411* 0.580*** 0.443** 
 (0.80) (1.65) (2.07) (-3.84) (2.19) (3.58) (2.78) 
Drug 
Source -0.777*** -0.628** -0.772*** 0.0914 -0.0755 -0.211 -0.602** 
 (-3.42) (-3.06) (-4.02) (0.37) (-0.35) (-1.22) (-3.26) 
Brothel 0.226 0.279* 0.210* -4.417*** 0.319** 0.386*** 0.0421 
 (1.78) (2.54) (2.15) (-11.21) (3.21) (3.80) (0.43) 
Pimping -0.494** -0.433** -0.413** 4.584*** -0.880*** -0.476** -0.408** 
 (-2.79) (-2.77) (-3.02) (11.09) (-4.27) (-3.17) (-2.82) 
CPI 0.136 0.0591 0.0654 0.0979 0.267*** -0.00285 0.00018 
 (1.59) (0.85) (1.04) (1.25) (3.51) (-0.05) (0.00) 
Polity 0.0843*** 0.0699** 0.0450* -0.00000363 -0.0494 0.0364* 0.0768*** 
 (3.83) (3.13) (2.35) (-0.00) (-1.88) (1.98) (3.52) 
Domestic 
Laws  
 
0.315 0.385* 0.618*** 0.250 0.0689 0.344* 0.206 
 (1.57) (2.19) (3.94) (-1.12) (0.39) (2.39) (1.45) 
Enforce -0.102 -0.0626 -0.618*** -0.167 -0.195 0.270* -0.207 
 (-0.60) (-0.41) (-4.15) (-0.87) (-1.26) (1.99) (-1.47) 
Infant 
Mortality 0.00407 0.0073 0.0169** -0.00454 0.0138 0.0162** 0.0228*** 
 (0.69) (1.34) (2.90) (-0.59) (1.88) (2.84) (4.09) 
Tourism 0.330*** 0.299*** 0.504*** 0.225* 0.204** 0.173** 0.342*** 
 (4.62) (4.24) (7.06) (2.18) (2.99) (3.09) (5.46) 
Security 0.0941 0.00768 0.0955 0.0663 0.0789 -0.0470 0.132* 
 (1.26) (0.12) (1.66) (0.77) (0.93) (-0.85) (2.38) 
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Elites 0.00716 0.00852 0.00102 0.0103 -0.0534 0.0041 0.000062 
 (0.74) (0.82) (0.09) (1.02) (-0.63) (0.35) (0.01) 
Constant -8.111*** 79.29*** -11.99*** -6.101*** -7.074*** 
-
5.260*** -9.463*** 
 (-4.94) (-4.44) (-7.49) (-2.93) (-4.88) (-4.10) (-6.53) 
X2 93.95*** 72.29*** 94.86*** 705.55*** 69.83*** 75.85*** 72.06*** 
N 411 411 411 411 411 411 411 
t statistics in parentheses      
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001     
 
My control variables generally performed as expected. More democratic countries 
associate with General Destination and Child Labor Destination, which aligns with my 
expectations. Democratic countries encourage freedom of behavior as well as freedom of 
movement of goods, which can facilitate trafficking. Democratic countries also tend to be 
wealthier and more stable, meaning that traffickers can expect to charge buyers more. 
Domestic Laws and Enforcement, however, also made countries more likely to be 
destination countries—contrary to my expectations, as I discuss more below. Infant 
Mortality (idenfitied by Bales, 2007; Aronowitz, 2001) was only significant for child 
labor, in which case it was positive. Tourism also performed as expected: it was 
significant and positive for general destination, prostitution, labor, and child labor. The 
country fragility measures (Security and Elites) were insignificant. 
Finally, I identified changes in predicted probability for each of my dependent 
variables based on changes in my independent variables. Table 3 displays the predicted 
probability changes of interest for models 1-4 from Table 2. Table 4 shows the predicted 
probability changes of interest for the remaining three models. I test the impact of 
changing Drug Destination, Drug Transit, and Drug Source from a 0 (the country is not a 
destination, transit, or source country) to a 1 (the country is a destination, transit, or 
source country) while Brothel and Pimping change from a 0 to a 1 and a 2 (brothels or 
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pimping are illegal, partially legal, or completely legal). For CPI, I test the impact of 
changing from the mean (4.82) to one standard deviation below and above the mean. I 
italicize the significant relationships. 
Table 3. Predicted Probabilities 1 
 
 
Value 
Change 
Changed 
Probability 
Percent 
Change 
General Destination 
Base Probability: 75.49       
Drug 
Destination 
 
0 1  98.96%  23.47%  
Drug Transit 0 1  69.85%  5.64%  
Drug Source 0 1  46.41%  -29.18%  
Brothel 0 1 2 81.86% 87.29% 6.37% 5.43% 
Pimping 0 1 2 57.54% 38.21% -17.95% -19.33% 
CPI 2.48 4.82 7.16 38.21% 84.13% 6.97% 8.65% 
Prostitution Destination 
Base Probability: 78.88%      
Drug 
Destination 
 
0 1  93.94%  15.52%  
Drug Transit 0 1  68.08%  10.44%  
Drug Source 0 1  56.37%  -22.15%  
Brothel 0 1 2 85.77% 91.15% 7.25% 5.38% 
Pimping 0 1 2 49.50% 46.81% -29.02% -2.69% 
CPI 2.48 4.82 7.16 65.07% 82.38% 4.30% 3.87% 
Labor Destination 
Base Probability: 37.83%      
Drug 
Destination 
 
0 1  39.74%  1.91%  
Drug Transit 0 1  25.45%  12.37%  
Drug Source 0 1  13.79%  -24.04%  
Brothel 0 1 2 46.02% 54.38% 8.19% 8.36% 
Pimping 0 1 2 23.27% 12.71% -14.56% -10.56% 
CPI 2.48 4.82 7.16 31.92% 43.64% 5.91% 5.81% 
Debt Bondage Destination 
Base Probability: 1.58%      
Drug 
Destination 
0 
1  4.75%  3.17%  
Drug Transit 0 1  8.53%  -6.95%  
Drug Source 0 1  1.97%  0.39%  
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Brothel 0 1 2 0.00% 0.00% -1.58% 0.00% 
Pimping 0 1 2 99.27% 99.99% 97.69% 0.72% 
CPI 2.48 4.82 7.16 0.87% 2.81% 0.71% 1.23% 
 
Table 4. Predicted Probabilities 2 
 
 
Value 
Change 
Changed 
Probability 
Percent 
Change 
Domestic Servitude Destination 
Base Probability: 9.34% 
Drug 
Destination 
0 
1  15.87%  6.34%  
Drug Transit 0 1  9.34%  22.34%  
Drug Source 0 1  8.08%  -7.74%  
Brothel 0 1 2 15.87% 24.83% 11.91% 8.74% 
Pimping 0 1 2 1.39% 0.10% -7.95% -1.29% 
CPI 2.48 4.82 7.16 2.56% 24.20% 6.78% 14.86% 
Child Prostitution Destination 
Base Probability: 69.15%    
Drug 
Destination 
0 
1  75.49%  6.34%  
Drug Transit 0 1  69.15%  22.34%  
Drug Source 0 1  61.41%  -7.74%  
Brothel 0 1 2 81.06% 89.80% 11.91% 8.74% 
Pimping 0 1 2 50.80% 32.28% -18.34% -18.52% 
CPI 2.48 4.82 7.16 69.15 68.79% 0.00% -0.36% 
Child Labor Destination 
Base Probability: 20.61%      
Drug 
Destination 
0 
1  27.76%  7.15%  
Drug Transit 0 1  20.61%  10.41%  
Drug Source 0 1  7.64%  -12.97%  
Brothel 0 1 2 21.48% 22.97% 0.87% 1.49% 
Pimping 0 1 2 10.94% 5.05% -9.67% -5.89% 
CPI 2.48 4.82 7.16 20.33% 20.610% 0.28% 0.00% 
 
These predicted probabilities reflect the substantive impact of changing the value 
of the independent variables. For instance, not only did Drug Destination positively 
associate with General Destination, the change is quite large. The predicted probability 
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of a country being a destination country for human trafficking in general, when the 
country is not a destination country for drugs, is already 75.49%. Becoming a destination 
country for drugs increases the probability of being a destination country for human 
trafficking to 98.96% (a 23.47% change). Drug Destination also affected large positive 
changes in the probability of countries being destination countries for prostitution and 
debt bondage. 
Drug transit countries, meanwhile, are less likely to be destination countries of 
debt bondage but more likely to be destination countries of labor, domestic servitude, 
child prostitution, and child labor. What is the substantive difference? The positive 
changes are all much larger than the negative change for Debt Bondage Destination. For 
Labor Destination, becoming a transit country increases the predicted probability by 
12.37%; for Domestic Servitude Destination, by 22.34%; for Child Prostitution 
Destination, by 22.34% again; for Child Labor Destination, by 10.41%. Meanwhile, 
moving from non-transit to transit only decreases the predicted probability for Debt 
Bondage Destination by 6.95% (from 8.53% to 1.58%). 
In all four models where Drug Source is significant, the effect is negative and 
quite large. Becoming a drug source country decreases the predicted probability for 
General Destination by 29.18%; for Prostitution Destination by 22.15%; for Labor 
Destination is similar: 24.04%; and for Child Labor Destination by 12.97%. With a few 
exceptions (such as Canada), drug source countries tend to be poorer. This alone would 
make them less attractive to human traffickers angling to get the highest profit from 
victims. Meanwhile, although drug transit and drug destination countries both involve 
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routes into the country, the organized criminal groups in drug source countries use their 
networks to move goods out of the country. 
The variables Brothel, Pimping, and CPI have three potential values. Fortunately, 
predicted probabilities give a more nuanced perspective than a linear fit, so I can see the 
different impact of increasing legality of brothels, for example, to first partially legal and 
then fully legal. 
Brothels make countries more likely to be destination countries of prostitution (by 
7.25% and 5.38%), labor (by 8.19% and 8.36%), domestic servitude (by 11.91% and 
8.74%), and child prostitution (by 11.91% and 8.74% again). Contrast this with Brothel’s 
effect on Debt Bondage Destination. It is negative but quite small: moving from 
completely illegal to partially legal decreases the probability of a country being a 
destination country for debt bondage by only .71 percentage points; moving from 
partially legal to fully legal has no impact. 
Pimping has a negative effect on General Destination (-17.95% and -19.33%), 
Prostitution Destination (-29.02% and -2.69%), Labor Destination (-14.56% and -
0.56%), Domestic Servitude Destination (-7.95% and -1.29%), Child Prostitution 
Destination (-18.34% and -18.52%), and Child Labor Destination (-9.67% and -5.89%). 
Pimping has a huge impact on destination countries for debt bondage. Moving from 
completely illegal to partially legal causes a 97.69 percentage point change (from 1.58% 
to 99.27%). Moving from partially legal to fully legal only makes a country 0.72% more 
likely to be a destination country. However, both Debt Bondage and Pimping are 
variables with little variance among my 83 cases, which is probably resulting in an over 
prediction. The different effects of legalizing brothels and legalizing pimping adds an 
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interesting take to the results of Cho (2012), who found that countries where prostitution 
is legal are more likely to be destination countries of human trafficking. 
CPI is only significant for one model: domestic servitude. In this case, increasing 
a country’s CPI score to the mean from one standard deviation below the mean increases 
the probability by 6.78% (from 2.56% to 9.34%). A score increase to one standard 
deviation above the mean has a bigger impact of 14.86% (from 9.34% to 24.2%). Less 
corruption continues to make countries more appealing as destination countries for 
domestic servitude, perhaps reflecting that police officers who are less corrupt are less 
likely to interfere in homes where domestic servitude victims are exploited. 
Together, my statistical analysis offers strong support for Hypothesis 1 (Drug 
Trafficking), mixed support for Hypothesis 2 (Legal Prostitution), and no support for 
Hypothesis 3 (Corruption). First, drug trafficking flows certainly seem to mirror human 
trafficking flows, suggesting that drug trafficking organizations that bring drugs through 
or to a given country can use those same resources to bring human victims into that 
country. Second, legalizing brothels seems to capture the connection between legalizing 
prostitution and human trafficking identified by Cho (2012), but legalizing pimping has 
the opposite effect, likely because brothels enjoy greater security and institutionalization 
which would appeal to johns in destination countries. Finally, CPI is generally 
insignificant—though, as discussed below, that might simply reflect its shortcomings as 
an aggregate measure. 
Robustness Tests 
I performed several robustness tests (see Appendix A). First, I wanted to capture 
the impact of adding procon.org’s measure for legality of prostitution for Hypothesis 2. 
30 
 
 
The legality of prostitution was insignificant except for its relationship with Domestic 
Servitude, where it was negative. This contradicted Hypothesis 2, but I have little faith in 
the validity of the measure, as I explain below, so I am willing to consider the results of 
Brothel and Pimping satisfactory for supporting Hypothesis 2. 
For Hypothesis 3, I considered other measures of corruption. First, I used a 
measure for state legitimacy captured by the Fragile States Index. Though the indicator 
did include measures of transparency and government corruption, it also measured 
political processes, political opposition, and political violence. It was insignificant. Then, 
in a separate test, I used the Rule of Law Index from the World Justice Project, which 
disaggregates its “Absence of Corruption” factor into absence of corruption in four 
separate categories: the executive branch, the judicial branch, the police and military, and 
the legislative branch. I tested for correlation between these separate categories (with data 
from 2012 and 2013) and the CPI data I collected from 2010, finding that CPI, while not 
correlated with absence of corruption in the executive or legislative branches, was more 
correlated with absence of corruption in the judicial branch than in the police and 
military. Since I expect street-level corruption to matter more, this might explain why 
CPI was generally insignificant in my models. 
The Human Trafficking Index (HTI) from which I derived my dependent 
variables also included several other variables worth exploring. For one, HTI included 
eighteen variables for other types of trafficking flows: for each type of trafficking 
(prostitution, labor, debt bondage, domestic servitude, child prostitution, and child labor) 
whether a country is a source country, a transit country, or whether the country 
experiences internal trafficking. These other variables were largely insignificant and I 
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expect there is high correlation between them, but I include the results for a probit 
regression using those eighteen variables as independent variables in the appendix to this 
research. 
HTI also includes several variables related to the countries’ response to 
trafficking: procedures to identify victims, protective services offered to victims, and 
punishment of victims for acts committed as victims.  
Bales (2007) suggests that high unemployment and a high percentage of the 
population that is male and over the age of 60 should both make countries more likely to 
be destination countries, so I ran an analysis including both variables with data from the 
World Bank. Unemployment was only significant for Labor Destination, Debt Bondage 
Destination, and Child Labor Destination. According to expectations, it was positive in 
each case. The percent male over the age of 60 was, counter to expectations, negative in 
three instances: for General Destination, Debt Bondage Destination, and Domestic 
Servitude Destination. It was only positive for Child Labor Destination; it was otherwise 
insignificant. Another test involved using a dichotomous variable for landlocked 
countries (with data from Thierry Mayer and Soledad Zignago’s (2011) Geodist dataset 
provided by CEPII) because many such countries are less developed. It was negative for 
Domestic Servitude Destination, Child Prostitution Destination, and Child Labor 
Destination. 
I also used logged GDP (with data from the World Bank) as a measure of 
development in place of Infant Mortality, but it was only significant for Child 
Prostitution Destination and Child Labor Destination. Counter to expectations, it was 
negative in both instances. The percentage of seats held by women in parliament (with 
32 
 
 
data from the World Bank) was insignificant, despite the research provided Schönhöfer 
(2017) which suggests that more women in parliament leads to better antitrafficking 
strategies. I included a measure of resource rents with GDP in an attempt to control for 
the resource curse, which I expected to positively associate with destination countries. 
Indeed, I found it significant and positive for every model except Domestic Servitude 
Destination and Child Prostitution Destination, for which it was insignificant. 
Discussion 
My results concerning Hypothesis 1 are promising. Drug Destination and Drug 
Transit were statistically significant in multiple models and were consistently positive—
the exception is Drug Transit’s negative relationship to Debt Bondage. The substantive 
impact, however, was much larger in the positive directions than in the negative 
direction. The trends—the positive trend of Drug Destination and Drug Transit and the 
negative trend of Drug Source—give me confidence in drawing a connection between the 
movement of one kind of illicit goods (drugs) and the movement of another kind of illicit 
goods (human victims). 
This creates several implications. For one, if human trafficking flows do indeed 
mirror drug trafficking flows, I infer that this is because criminals use similar networks 
and take advantage of similar weak points. If only drug destination countries were 
significant, I might infer that the primary explanatory variable concerns the demand for 
illicit good and that wealth might be more impactful. However, given that drug transit 
countries are also significant while GDP is actually insignificant, I instead infer that 
organized criminal groups’ facilitation of illicit trafficking is a powerful factor of human 
trafficking. 
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It is also possible that the illicit flow of drugs encourages the creation and 
acceptance of illegal economies in destination countries. Destination countries for drugs 
might inspire a market for illicit goods in general and a country that consumes large 
amounts of drugs on the black market could have less qualms about participating in other 
illegal behavior, such as the exploitation of other people. 
There are at least two ways to respond to drug trafficking’s connection to human 
trafficking. The most obvious, perhaps, is to eliminate drug trafficking routes. If human 
traffickers are enjoying the convenience of drug trafficking routes, officials who attack 
such networks and shore up such weak points would force traffickers to use other, less 
convenient resources. The other option would be to legalize drugs, thus minimizing the 
market for drug trafficking might indirectly hinder human trafficking to destination 
countries. 
My results concerning prostitution-related measures are intriguing. Legality of 
brothels and pimping produced contradictory effects. Legal brothels make countries more 
likely to be destination countries of prostitution, labor, domestic servitude, and child 
prostitution but less likely to be destination countries of debt bondage. I expect that 
legalizing brothels creates a demand for victims of sexual exploitation but also creates a 
mentality that has no moral aversion to using other people for personal gain. Sex work 
inevitably increases the exploitation of vulnerable individuals who perhaps would not 
choose such a job if they had other options, yet legalizing brothels causes sex work to 
become normalized, formalized, even institutionalized. This means that johns need not 
bother with the moral calculus of their actions. In addition to excusing johns of 
concerning themselves with the legality of their use of prostitutes, legalizing brothels 
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creates a society that that sees the moral risks inherent to sex work as acceptable; such a 
society could be prone to accept the moral risks involving other forms of exploitation as 
well. The additional organization of brothels would also make it easier for traffickers to 
supply victims with false documents. 
Legalizing brothels had only a slight negative effect in the case of debt bondage. I 
would expect legalizing brothels to make debt bondage more likely because the formal 
institution of brothels lends itself to the imposition of fees and fines on victims; the 
negative relationship might simply be because my analysis did not include enough cases 
of debt bondage. Overall, Brothel’s many positive effects cause me to consider the results 
for Brothel supportive of Hypothesis 2, that legalizing prostitution makes countries more 
likely to be destination countries of human trafficking. 
Legal pimping, on the other hand, makes countries more likely to be destination 
countries for debt bondage but less likely to be destination countries for general 
destination, prostitution, labor, domestic servitude, child prostitution, and child labor. 
Because the results for Pimping are so overwhelmingly negative, I conclude that my 
results for Pimping do not support Hypothesis 2. One possible explanation for why 
pimping decreases that likelihood of a country being a destination country of human 
trafficking is that pimping is associated with less affluence; while brothels can signal 
higher quality to clients and, therefore, tend to operate in high-end markets, pimps are 
more associated with low-end markets (Farmer and Horowitz, 2013). If high-end markets 
tend to be destination countries (countries of greater wealth and opportunity), legalizing 
brothels should enhance countries’ appeal as destination countries yet legalizing pimping 
would decrease the appeal as destination countries. 
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It is worth noting that the percentage the population that is male and over the age 
of 60 reduced the likelihood of a country being a destination country for trafficking in 
general and debt bondage and domestic servitude in particular, only increasing the 
likelihood for Child Labor (see Appendix A). This contradicts previous research finding 
that the more men over the age of 60 should make a country more likely to be a 
destination country (Aronowitz, 2001). Then again, johns in the U.S. are more likely to 
be younger, so perhaps the measure of men over the age of 60 fails to capture the demand 
side of sex trafficking (Brewer et al., 2008). Considering this, I am hesitant to rule out the 
demand effect of legalizing prostitution, especially through legalizing brothels. 
My corruption results present a bit of a puzzle for Hypothesis 3. CPI was only 
significant in one case and it was positive—countries that are less corrupt are more likely 
to be destination countries for domestic servitude. This might be uniquely related to 
domestic servitude in that employers of victims of domestic servitude might enjoy 
diplomatic immunity (U.S. State Department); a robust rule of law might therefore shield 
exploiters from investigation and prosecution. 
Another possible explanation for the difficulty concerning corruption, aside from 
the fact that corruption itself is difficult to measure accurately, may be that corruption 
and its connection to police effectiveness can have opposite but simultaneous effects, 
particularly in destination countries. On the one hand, corruption can enable traffickers to 
move victims freely; greater corruption thus makes it easier for a country to become part 
of the international network of human trafficking. On the other, effective law 
enforcement (involving less corruption) can cause victims to have more relative value; in 
this case, less corruption makes a country more attractive as a destination country from 
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traffickers’ perspective. Furthermore, effective enforcement of laws against victims who 
enter destination countries illegally effectively traps victims by making them more 
dependent on traffickers and employers. 
I also want to consider the separate effects of the existence of domestic laws 
against human trafficking and the enforcement of those laws. Domestic laws make 
countries more likely to be destination countries of prostitution and child prostitution; 
enforcement of those laws further increases the likelihood of a country being a 
destination country of child prostitution. My research supports the minority position of 
Akee et al. (2014), which is that laws against trafficking and their enforcement make 
countries more likely to be destination countries by increasing the value of victims within 
that country, particularly for victims of sexual exploitation. One possible implication of 
this interplay is such laws should not be propagated unless they are matched with strict 
enforcement or enforcement that punishes johns. Yet even strict enforcement might 
ultimately entice traffickers to bring victims of sexual exploitation to that country. 
Domestic laws and their enforcement have a different effect on labor trafficking. 
Although domestic laws positively associate with labor destination countries, 
enforcement of those laws negatively associate with labor destination countries. This 
might reflect that corruption and enforcement at the street level—by police and border 
patrol—matter more than corruption and enforcement at other levels of government. 
Given the Corruption Perception Index’s correlation with absence of corruption in the 
judiciary rather than absence of corruption in the police and military, perhaps a 
disaggregated measure of corruption would be more effective. After all, corruption in the 
judiciary is only relevant during prosecution of traffickers or, when victims are accused 
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of crimes, during prosecution of victims. Considering that corrupt officials begin 
enabling exploitation at the border and on the streets by ignoring evidence of forced labor 
long before cases reach the judiciary, a disaggregated measure of corruption at the street 
level might be more significant. 
Some of the variables I included in my robustness tests performed unexpectedly. 
First, my measure for whether countries punish victims was consistently positive—this 
might relate to corruption (Hypothesis 3) or the legal understanding of prostitution 
(Hypothesis 2). If related to Hypothesis 2, the idea that punishing victims makes 
countries more likely to be destination countries give credence to the semi-legal approach 
of punishing clients but not prostitutes themselves. The percentage of the population that 
is over 60 years old and male, which Bales (2007) found to positively associate with 
destination countries, was actually negative in every model in which it was significant. 
Unemployment, typically understood to be less common in destination countries, was 
positive in every model in which it was significant. Taken together, this suggests that the 
distinction between developed and less developed countries probably has a more nuanced 
effect. 
Limitations 
Despite rising awareness of human trafficking, many difficulties face efforts to 
perform quantitative research. One glaring difficulty is the use of different legal 
definitions between governments. In 2000, the United Nations adopted the Protocol to 
Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, which defines human trafficking as 
the “recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of persons” through twelve 
different means, from coercion to giving or receiving payments or benefits (United 
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Nations General Assembly, 2000: 2). A case need involve only one of those twelve 
elements, regardless of whether or not the victim consents to the arrangement. Other 
governments add or subtract to the U.N.’s requirements. For example, the U.S. State 
Department defines human trafficking more narrowly. A case only becomes a sex 
trafficking case if the adult becomes involved in prostitution by means of coercion, force, 
deception, or debt bondage. Subsequent consent is relevant; initial consent is only 
irrelevant if, after giving consent, the trafficker then maintains the victim’s position 
through “psychological manipulation or physical force” (U.S. State Department, 2017: 
16). The State Department’s approach risks excluding real cases of exploitation to which 
victims initially consented. 
Human trafficking itself is difficult to measure quantitatively across many 
countries and over time. Some data sources exclude certain types of human trafficking 
(such as debt bondage) to focus on others (such as sexual exploitation) while others 
conflate the types. The best I could do was find the HTI which ultimately measures 
trafficking flows. (The index also measures numbers of persons prosecuted, but not every 
country provided data for this measure such that to include it would severely reduce the 
scope of my research.) Trafficking flows does not distinguish between rates of 
trafficking: I know that Argentina, Saudi Arabia, and Switzerland are all destination 
countries, but I don’t know if Argentina is a destination for more victims. Another 
difficulty with HTI is that it codes countries by primarily relying on the U.S. State 
Department’s annual Trafficking In Persons reports. While these reports do include data 
for many countries over many years, the report has come under fire due to lack of data 
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and subjectivity and understanding of cultural differences (Schartz, 2017; Wooditch, 
2011). 
I faced a similar problem with collecting data for drug trafficking. I relied upon 
reports published by the U.S. State Department which focused on trafficking routes that 
affect the United States, though in some cases it included countries that are involved in 
international trafficking only within a given region. Unable to find a database, I coded the 
variables myself based on what I read in the report; this leaves room for error and perhaps 
another researcher would interpret the reports differently. Regardless, the report discusses 
trafficking routes but does not give numbers on drugs trafficked for every country. Thus, 
though I know both Spain and Thailand are destinations for drugs, I don’t know which is 
a destination for more drugs. Similarly, I know that both Kenya and Austria serve as 
transit countries, but I don’t know which country has more drugs cross its borders.  
Another challenge came in the form of coding the legality of prostitution in 
various countries. I used procon.org’s measures as a start and then investigated whether 
legislation changed from 2006 to 2010, updating accordingly. Again, perhaps another 
researcher would update differently—either registering slight changes in legislation or 
ignoring changes that I registered depending on whether they sought a more or less 
sensitive measure. One glaring difficulty with procon.org’s measurement is the ambiguity 
of “partially legal” as a level of legality. In some cases, “partially legal” would apply to 
cases like Sweden, where the purchase of sex rather than the offering of sex is 
criminalized. Other cases like Bangladesh and Japan, are also coded “partially legal” 
even though in Bangladesh female prostitution above 18 years of age is legal but male 
prostitution is illegal while in Japan only non-coital sexual acts are not illegal.  
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Other challenges come from attempting to measure corruption. Indices like the 
CPI are useful in that they apply to many countries over many years, but the aggregated 
data makes it difficult to identify what forms of corruption are the most impactful. 
Corrupt border patrol officers likely have a very different impact on human trafficking 
than corrupt senators who in some instances may be involved in human trafficking but in 
many cases are guilty of upper-level close-door deals and manipulation that have little to 
do with human trafficking. Measures of from FSI such as SL and HR are also aggregate; 
they touch on issues related to corruption, but SL also asks questions about the political 
institutions such as elections and HR asks about civil and political freedoms. A given 
country’s score might be a reflection of those other issues rather than levels of corruption. 
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CHAPTER THREE: CASE STUDIES 
Now I consider some specific countries to both test and illustrate the results taken 
from my statistical analysis. I select cases based on the mixed-methods nested analysis 
approach designed by Lieberman (2005). This approach uses the large-N statistical 
analysis to inform case selection for the subsequent small-N analysis. Lieberman 
recommends using the small-N analysis to direct either model-testing or further model-
building. Because I am generally satisfied with the results of my large-N analysis, I use 
the following case studies to test the applicability of my results, bearing in mind which 
examples support which hypotheses (see Table 5). 
I selected specific cases in two ways. First, I considered only destination 
countries. I then found cases with variance in my primary explanatory variables: drug 
trafficking routes, legality of brothels and pimping, and corruption. I selected cases where 
the variables seemed to perform based on my expectation as well as cases where they 
performed unexpectedly. Second, I considered only non-destination countries. Again, I 
found variance in drug trafficking routes, legality of brothels and pimping, and corruption 
and investigated some cases where those variables performed expectedly as well as cases 
where they did not to explain why those countries were not destination countries. 
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Table 5. Case Studies 
 
Country Drug Flow Prostitution CPI Destination Hypothesis 
Supported 
United 
States 
Destination Brothel: illegal 
Pimping: illegal 
7.25 Yes 1: Drug Flow 
New 
Zealand 
No Brothel: legal 
Pimping: legal 
9.45 Yes 2: Prostitution 
Uruguay No Brothel: illegal 
Pimping: illegal 
6.625 No 1: Drug Flow 
2: Prostitution 
3: Corruption 
Bangladesh Transit Brothel: legal 
Pimping: legal 
2.1 No None 
Albania Transit 
Source 
Brothel: illegal 
Pimping: illegal 
2.9 No 2: Prostitution 
Mexico Transit 
Source 
Brothel: illegal 
Pimping: illegal 
3.4 Yes 1: Drug Flow 
3: Corruption 
Thailand Destination 
Transit 
Brothel: illegal 
Pimping: illegal 
3.6 Yes 1: Drug Flow 
3: Corruption 
The United States, New Zealand, and Uruguay 
First, I consider the United States, New Zealand, and Uruguay. I group these three 
together because all three are destination countries with relatively good scores for 
corruption but interesting variance regarding drug trafficking flows, legality of 
prostitution, and the behavior of police officers. Comparing these three illuminates 
several points but I want to focus on corruption as, despite relatively high Corruption 
Perceptions Index scores, the role of law enforcement plays out differently between them. 
The United States and New Zealand are also both wealthier countries and serve as 
destination countries for various types of tourism. But beyond the role of wealth, the role 
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of law enforcement seems to explain why the United States and New Zealand are 
destination countries for human trafficking whereas Uruguay is not. 
The United States 
The United States is a destination country for every type of human trafficking 
except for domestic servitude. The United Sates is a destination country for drugs, has 
strict laws against prostitution (except in Nevada), and enjoys a high average CPI score 
of 7.25. It also experiences various kinds of internal trafficking. The U.S. as a destination 
country is only consistent with Hypothesis 1 (Drug Trafficking). I find that the wealth of 
the U.S. allows traffickers to expect a high price for victims brought into the U.S. The 
established resources and networks of drug traffickers simplifies the human trafficking 
process. Finally, failure to protect victims of sexual exploitation and a crackdown on 
illegal immigration (without regard for the possibility that illegal immigrants are victims 
of trafficking) hinder the legal battle against human trafficking. 
In 2005 in the United States, the Department of Justice estimated that between 
14,500 and 17,500 victims were trafficked annually into the United States (Siskin and 
Wyler, 2011). Victim demographics reveal more patterns: noncitizens comprise more 
victims of labor trafficking than do U.S. citizens; noncitizens also comprise more victims 
in labor trafficking than in sex trafficking while U.S. citizens are more likely to be 
victims of commercial sexual exploitation (Siskin and Wyler, 2011). 
Despite the war on drugs declared in 1971, the U.S. has long been a lucrative 
market for drug trafficking organizations. In the 1980s, Reagan sought to tie U.S. foreign 
policy to this war on drugs by focusing on interdiction (Jenner, 2011). By the early 
1990s, about a third of heroin and marijuana imported into the U.S. came from Mexico 
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(Astorga and Shirk, 2010). In addition to interdiction efforts (using the U.S. Coast Guard 
and U.S. military), the U.S. has also funded operations worldwide to battle drug 
trafficking at different points (Jenner, 2011). Both interdiction and international projects 
have been costly and only minimally effective at stemming the flow of drugs into the 
U.S.—by increasing the price of drugs, interdiction increases profits to traffickers; and 
“experts believe that seventy percent of a drug needs to be intercepted worldwide to 
substantially reduce the size of the industry,” an elusive goal (Jenner, 2011: 913). 
Though the illegality of prostitution creates social norms against pimps and 
brothels, but those norms are undermined by a media that glamorizes pimping and 
prostitution (Kotrla, 2010). The illegality of prostitution has a greater impact on street-
level police and on victims themselves, causing victims to think of themselves as 
criminals rather than victims (Kotrla, 2010). The fact that law enforcement can more 
easily enforce prostitution laws than anti-trafficking laws only reinforces this mentality 
(Heiges, 2009). Rather than going to the police for help, victims fear the police. In many 
cases, responses to trafficking are counterproductive for young victims who typically find 
themselves placed in juvenile detention centers or insecure facilities or returned to the 
very circumstances from which they originally fled (Kotrla, 2010). 
Despite the TVPA which attempts to protect victims from human trafficking, the 
U.S.’ hardline approach to law enforcement produces other harmful effects concerning 
labor trafficking: “border interdiction strategies, harsh penalties for undocumented 
migrant workers, and insufficient labor protections for all workers, but particularly 
undocumented migrants” all ultimately enable trafficking by putting smugglers as well as 
employers in a position of power relative to migrants who can easily become victims of 
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forced labor (Chacon, 2006: 2979). Even migrants who come to the U.S. legally but then 
overstay their visas can easily become victimized (Chacon, 2006). Though victims of 
trafficking can stay in the U.S. under a T visa, T visas are not commonly issued. In order 
to receive one, victims must have experienced “severe forms of exploitation,” aid the 
prosecution of their exploiters, and demonstrate that returning to their home country 
would result in “extreme hardship involving unusual and severe harm” (Chacon, 2006: 
3011). As with sex trafficking, victims of labor trafficking are aware that they would be 
considered criminals rather than victims and, therefore, do not feel comfortable going to 
the police for help. 
In addition to causing victims to feel like criminals, effective law enforcement 
creates a power imbalance between victims and exploiters. According to Chacon (2006), 
smugglers’ roles are expanding in the face of increased border security in the U.S. such 
that, as migration becomes more difficult, migrants turn to smugglers who exploit 
migrants’ vulnerability with higher costs for more services, sometimes resulting in 
coercive relationships with migrants who become trafficking victims. Furthermore, as 
increased border security traps migrants within the U.S., the migrants are unable to 
escape to their home country. This gives them little choice but to endure exploitation by 
current employers who may turn a blind eye to migrants’ lack of papers—until migrants 
begin organizing against workplace exploitation in violation of labor laws, at which point 
employers threaten to report them to immigration officials (Chacon, 2006). In other 
words, more effective enforcement of select laws combined with stringent border security 
can redirect victims into the traps of traffickers instead of deterring trafficking. 
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New Zealand 
New Zealand’s tourism popularity and proximity to poorer South Asian countries 
encourage traffickers to expect a high profit from bringing vulnerable victims to New 
Zealand. Then victims of sex trafficking remain vulnerable to exploitation (even though 
prostitution is legal) because geographic and social isolation make it difficult for them to 
find help from the police, who seem uninterested in actually regulating prostitution. New 
Zealand is not involved in international drug trafficking, brothels and pimping are both 
completely legal, and its average Corruption Perceptions Index score is quite high: 9.45. 
Contrary to Hypotheses 1(Drug Trafficking) and 3 (Government Corruption) but in 
alignment with Hypothesis 2 (Legal Prostitution), it is a destination country. New 
Zealand doesn’t experience any form of labor trafficking, but it is a destination country 
for prostitution and debt bondage. 
New Zealand is fairly insulated from the international drug trafficking networks. 
Drug trafficking organizations have few resources and must compete with New Zealand’s 
strategic war against criminal organizations. New Zealand battles organized crime with 
international multilateral treaties as well as thorough internal cooperation: cross-agency, 
cross-jurisdictional, and international (New Zealand Government, 2011). Though 
criminal organizations do attempt to corrupt and influence officials, drug traffickers’ 
limited revenue limits their capabilities to corrupt (Wilkins and Casswell., 2003). The 
2009 legislation of Gangs and Organized Crime cracked down on group criminal 
behavior and Immigration New Zealand specifically targets people smuggling offshore 
(New Zealand Government, 2011). 
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In 2003, New Zealand decriminalized prostitution with the goals of protecting sex 
workers’ human rights and physical health and protecting children from exploitation. 
Despite the fact that the prostitution bill allows health officers entry to brothels, the 
officers can only respond to violence, not prevent it, and although those in favor of 
legalizing prostitution argue that prostitutes working in brothels are safer than those in 
the streets, the truth is that they move between types of prostitution “depending on the 
location of johns, the level of police harassment, and where the most money can be 
made” (Farley, 2016: 1099). Furthermore, all types of prostitution result in psychological 
and physical trauma (Farley, 2016). In fact, though street-level pimps may be over a 
lower class, some prostitutes preferred working streets because they have more freedom 
to reject drunk or unruly clients (Farley, 2016). 
The new bill has also increased the demand side of prostitution by “relieving 
johns of any doubts regarding the social acceptability of their sexual predation while at 
the same time inviting them to spend their money” (Farley, 2016: 1088). As for 
protecting physical health by offering legal redress against violence, that is questionable: 
prostitutes in New Zealand already had legal options but rarely took advantage of them, 
preferring to avoid a legal record of prostitution (Farley, 2016). New Zealand’s law 
required the “zoning” of prostitution—which may result in further stigmatizing and 
isolating prostitutes (Farley, 2016: 1092). 
New Zealand’s lack of corruption and better law enforcement seem unable to 
capitalize on the opportunities provided by regulation of prostitution. Although it 
experiences relatively less organized crime—and the organized crime is more limited—it 
seems that though legalizing prostitution might result in more protection for prostitutes (if 
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the prostitutes choose to avail themselves of the legal opportunities), it also increases the 
demand side. In addition, the zoning laws for prostitution might make it easier for clients 
to find prostitutes. Combined with New Zealand’s relatively high level of development, 
all of this might explain New Zealand’s appeal as a destination country. 
Uruguay 
Uruguay is not a major country in international drug trafficking, has strict laws 
against and regulations of brothels and pimping, and enjoys a relatively high average 
Corruption Perceptions Index score of 6.625. Consistent with all three of my hypotheses, 
it is not a destination country for human trafficking, though it is a source and transit 
country for many types of trafficking and also experiences internal trafficking. Despite 
networks of both drug and human trafficking surrounding it, Uruguay is not a major 
destination country. Without drug trafficking networks into Uruguay, human traffickers 
must work harder to bring victims to Uruguay; meanwhile, unlike in New Zealand, police 
officers respond to complaints of exploitation raised by prostitutes. 
Uruguay employs a diligent strategy against drug trafficking and organized crime. 
The Citizen Security Law involves a charge of crimes of omission, which can be brought 
against “public officials who do not act on knowledge of a drug-related crime” (U.S. 
State Department, 2009: 610). In August of 2009, Uruguay created a special court 
dedicated to organized crime, responding to drug trafficking and corruption among other 
things (U.S. State Department, 2009). This reflects Uruguay’s general approach of 
prioritizing combatting drug trafficking, resulting in more intelligence in its counter-
narcotics divisions and better, non-intrusive inspection equipment at ports (U.S. State 
Department, 2009). This might also explain why, although Uruguay is surrounded by 
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drug trafficking in South America, it is not itself involved a significant player in the 
international drug trafficking network. 
Uruguay’s history regarding prostitution, brothels, and pimps evinces the 
combined effect of legalizing prostitution coupled with regulations and responsive law 
enforcement. Montevideo used brothel regulation as an attempt to ensure “discretion and 
the sanitary status of the building and the prostitutes, through periodic medical 
examinations” (Schettini, 2017). The 1930s laid the foundation for contemporary 
legislation: Gabriel Terra’s regime instituted the “prostitute card,” a kind of precursor to 
Decree 651 in 1990 instituting a health card for Uruguayans (Rosengurtt, 2016: 2). 
Combined with the “sanitary card” required for sex workers as of 2002, the legislation 
increased the responsibilities for those in charge of sex workers, who are required to 
undergo periodic sanitary and health checks (Rosengurtt, 2016: 4). The difficulty with 
brothels is that although prostitutes were less often deceived and kidnapped, contrary to 
common narratives, the price of renting space in brothels renders prostitutes vulnerable to 
owners (Schettini, 2017). Yet, regarding pimps, women are not averse to accusing pimps 
who “broke their rules of coexistence” and reporting them to police, who sometimes 
expulsed the pimps if they were foreigners (Schettini, 2017).  
Uruguay’s intentional efforts against corruption and drug trafficking might 
explain why it is less attractive as a destination country. Furthermore, the history of law 
enforcement responsive to prostitutes’ complaints against pimps together with its many 
regulations for sex workers might make it unappealing as a destination country, though it 
does experience internal prostitution trafficking. Perhaps the regulations served to put 
women more under the control of those taking them for health checks, as similar 
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regulations did for Thailand, but the regulations coupled with effective law enforcement 
and relatively less corruption may also deter traffickers from selecting Uruguay as a 
destination country. Because the regulations are actually enforced, they might 
inconvenience traffickers enough that traffickers decide to bring victims elsewhere. 
Bangladesh and Albania 
I group Bangladesh and Albania together because of their common traits. Both do 
poorly with regard to common pull factors of human trafficking. Neither is well off 
financially, although Albania enjoys a higher score for democracy. Both are also involved 
in the international drug trade, but neither are destination countries for drugs. They 
diverge with regards to legalization of prostitution but although neither are destination 
countries for human trafficking, both experience internal prostitution and internal child 
prostitution trafficking. Together, they demonstrate that legalizing or criminalizing 
prostitution is not in and of itself sufficient to determine a country’s appeal as a 
destination country, particularly if there is not enough wealth in the country to sustain a 
demand, both for drugs and for victims of trafficking. 
Bangladesh 
As a poor country, Bangladesh isn’t a destination for human trafficking because 
traffickers do not expect victims brought to Bangladesh to result in a profit. At the same 
time, Bangladesh is a source and transit country for trafficking as well as a transit country 
for drugs; illicit goods (drugs and people) appear to go through Bangladesh rather than 
stopping there. With its contribution to the drug market, legal prostitution, and low 
average Corruption Perception Index (only 2.1), Bangladesh defies all three of my 
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hypotheses by not being a destination country for human trafficking, though it is a source 
and transit country for many types of trafficking and also experiences internal trafficking. 
Aside from the significance of its status as a less developed and relatively poor 
country, Bangladesh has porous land, sea, and air borders and struggles to organize 
coordinated government responses despite its myriad law enforcement units involved in 
counter narcotics, with some customs officers like those at Zia International Airport 
apparently preferring not to inconvenience customers by searching luggage thoroughly 
(U.S. State Department, 2009). Perhaps because drug traffickers see Bangladesh as a 
transit country rather than a destination country, human traffickers treat it similarly. 
Bangladesh does experience human trafficking, but most of it is internal. For 
instance, consider its brothels. The largest brothel in Bangladesh, the Tan Bazar brothel, 
which includes a children’s clinic, and advertises certain services available for 
prostitutions in an attached clinic: “contraceptives, counseling, condoms, STD/HIV 
treatment, abortion, antenatal and postnatal checkups, infertility care, gynecological care, 
and treatment of minor ailments” (Farley, 2008: 1114). If Bangladesh is less inviting as a 
destination country for other reasons (primarily its relative poverty and position as a 
transit country for human trafficking), perhaps the legality of brothels and pimping only 
serves to enable internal trafficking within Bangladesh, preying on indigent young 
women with few economic options. 
Bangladesh has historically struggled with corruption in every sector, the result of 
a history of political unrest and violence (Knox, 2009b). Corruption in law enforcement 
is the most prominent, with land administration and the judiciary closely behind (Knox, 
2009a). The military coup of 2007 resulted in the declaration of a state of emergency and 
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the suspension of constitutional rights, supposedly to make room for the new “Caretaker 
Government” to better provide services while simultaneously detaining politicians and 
business leaders as part of an anti-corruption effort (Knox, 2009b: 454). The new 
government also implemented institutional reforms: improving the Electoral Commission 
and amending electoral laws, reforming the Public Service Commission, replacing the 
Bureau of Anti-Corruption with the Anti-Corruption Commission, and separating the 
Judiciary from the Executive (Knox, 2009b). However, the military lost the parliamentary 
election in 2008 and though the following government restored some civil and political 
rights, the lingering Anti-Corruption Commission failed to effectively tackle corruption 
at an institutional level (Knox, 2009b). 
Albania 
Poor like Bangladesh, human traffickers do not expect victims brought to Albania 
to result in a profit. Drug and human traffickers can use the same resources and networks 
to bring contraband both from and through Albania. Albania functions as a transit and 
source country for drug trafficking, has laws against both brothels and pimping, and has 
an average Corruption Perception Index score of only 2.9. Contrary to Hypothesis 1 
(Drug Trafficking) but in support of Hypotheses 2 (Legal Prostitution) and 3 
(Government Corruption), it is not a destination country for human trafficking, though it 
is a source country for prostitution, labor, child prostitution, and child labor and, like 
Bangladesh, experiences internal prostitution and child prostitution trafficking. 
Why is Albania not a destination country? The typical explanation of lack of 
wealth is certainly at play. Considering that it is still involved in human trafficking as a 
source country, traffickers are probably not deterred for institutional or political reasons. 
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Instead, they simply do not consider Albania a worthwhile investment. Rather, potential 
victims (particularly young women) are so vulnerable due to lack of education and 
economic opportunity that traffickers find it far easier to bring victims from Albania than 
to bring them to Albania. 
Another reason why Albania is not recognized as a destination country might 
simply be that Albania is not a destination country for drug trafficking. Instead, an 
effective organized crime network moves both drugs and people through Albania to 
Europe rather than to Albania itself; groups that traffic migrants also traffic them through 
and from Albania (primarily to Italy) rather than to Albania (Cornell, 2012). Albanian 
human traffickers cooperate with traffickers from Kosovo, where poor peacekeeping 
efforts combined with legal prostitution led to human trafficking and therefore more 
money for the Kosovo Liberation Army ultimately strengthened Albanian organized 
crime (Surtees, 2008; Cornell, 2012). Often trafficked illegally across borders, Albanian 
victims reach destination countries abroad and feel unable to go to law enforcement for 
help due to lack of authentic documents (Surtees, 2008). 
Political and social instability in Eastern Europe led to a wave of sex trafficking 
from countries formerly affected by the Soviet Union (and its collapse) to other countries, 
particularly in Western Europe. Albania is a prominent example. Social norms against 
prostitution already made victims, once trafficked, virtually unable to return to their home 
communities which serves to heighten their vulnerability to exploiters (Van Hook et al., 
2006). In response to the flow of victims from Albania, the government launched a 
coalition to combat trafficking involving research, education, and programs related to 
trafficking as well as efforts to improve law enforcement (including strict punishments 
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against trafficking) and border control (Van Hook et al., 2006). Brothels and pimping are 
illegal but pimping is easier to hide; pimps operating within Albania exploit victims 
through “bars, hotels, motels and private agencies” (Corrin, 2004: 182). Victims are often 
exploited by soldiers and peacekeepers (Corrin, 2004). In the late 1990s, destination 
countries (Italy, Belgium, and France) began deporting Albanian women and girls who 
“were detained in Albanian police stations, treated as criminals and often became the 
target of police sexual abuse” (Corrin, 2004: 182). 
Beyond that, Albania remains vulnerable to human trafficking due to gaps in law 
enforcement. Despite Albania’s low Corruption Perception Index score, an increased 
number of cases filed and prosecuted against corrupt officials from 2005 and 2006 
demonstrates a commitment by both police and prosecutors to intentionally combat 
corruption (U.S. State Department, 2009). In 2002, Albanian law enforcement outlawed 
certain water vessels offshore for a three-year period (U.S. State Department, 2009); 
nevertheless, while this appeared to hinder drug movement to Italy, it simply redirected 
human trafficking routes to overland routes (Surtees, 2008). These new routes were 
enabled by open border policies between Albania and Kosovo, “enabling trafficking in 
both directions” (Surtees, 2008: 54). Finally, corrupt officials (police officers, soldiers, 
and peacekeepers) who exploit women and girls find plenty of vulnerable individuals 
within Albania without needing to look for victims trafficked into the country. 
Mexico and Thailand 
Mexico and Thailand both have laws against prostitution, but the prevalence of 
organized crime and ineffective or insufficient law enforcement make it difficult to 
enforce those laws. They both also suffer the effects of a strong international illegal drug 
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economy contributing to a demand for many illicit behaviors and goods. This highlights 
the vulnerabilities created by such inability to control drug trafficking and the importance 
of effective enforcement of laws against crimes related to human trafficking. 
Mexico 
Mexico has an extensive illegal economy of both drugs and prostitution. Drug 
trafficking routes can be used by human traffickers to ultimately bring both drugs and 
human victims into the country. Mexico’s legal institutions are weak, lacking solid 
definitions of human trafficking, and Mexico’s enforcement of its laws at the street level 
is also ineffective. Mexico is a source and transit country for drugs with laws against 
brothels and pimping and an average Corruption Perceptions Index score of 3.4. 
Consistent with Hypotheses 1 (Drug Trafficking) and 3 (Government Corruption) but 
inconsistent with Hypothesis 2 (Legal of Prostitution), it is a destination country for 
victims of commercial sexual exploitation and forced labor. It is also a source and transit 
country for the same types of human trafficking. It experiences very little internal 
trafficking. 
2006 through 2010 saw Mexico employing military tactics against organized 
crime and drug trafficking organizations and partnering with the U.S. government—with 
mixed results. “Militarization has produced a dramatic increase in human rights 
violations, contributed to corruption and defection among Mexican military personnel, 
and unnecessarily escalated the level of conflict and violence” (Astorga and Shirk, 2010: 
3). The U.S., meanwhile, has donated U.S. equipment and training through the Mérida 
Initiative, resulting in “a steady stream of arrests and extraditions targeting organized 
crime, as well as record seizures of drugs, guns, and cash” (Astorga and Shirk, 2010: 3). 
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The efforts, however, have so far failed to curb availability, consumption and potency of 
drugs (Astorga and Shirk, 2010). Meanwhile, corruption remains a severe impediment to 
Mexico’s ability to thwart key players in drug trafficking (U.S State Department, 2009). 
As for prostitution itself, though brothels and pimping are both illegal, there are 
no laws against prostitution itself and zonas de tolerencia are historic traits of northern 
border cities since 1945. The “district” zonas involve myriad forms of adult 
entertainment not limited to prostitution whereas “compound” zonas reflect the 
“geopolitical sink principle” in which “immoral institutions have often been confined to 
areas with limited political clout” (Curtis and Arreola, 1991:339). The compound zonas 
also tend to enjoy more institutional consistency, including gatehouses, police posts, and 
especially medical clinics where prostitutes (who must register officially) can undergo 
the required examinations (Curtis and Arreola, 1991). Notably, streetwalkers (called 
clandestinas) are unaffiliated with specific bars and not allowed within the zona (Curtis 
and Arreola, 1991). According to research on zonas between 1987 and 1990, politics at 
the state or municipio level can lead to the shutting down of zonas, but such reform rarely 
has rarely lasted due to the income generated by prostitution through taxes, fees, and 
income as well as through corruption (Curtis and Arreola, 1991). Indeed, later research 
found that such zonas seem to persist: as of 2002, Bucardo et al. found that in certain 
states of Mexico, “a registry of sex workers is maintained, periodic medical exams for 
sex workers are required, and the activity is confined to the authorized area of town or 
designated establishment” (344). 
Mexico’s legal standards are a weak point: it fails at both effectively prosecuting 
traffickers and protecting victims (Cicero-Domínguez, 2005). Sex tourism from the U.S. 
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into Mexico is common, but despite ratifying several agreements against trafficking, 
Mexico lacks a comprehensive legal definition making it difficult to distinguish between 
child victims of trafficking and child victims of other kinds of abuse (Gozdiak and Colet, 
2005); Mexico further fails to acknowledge other forms of trafficking such as forced 
labor (Cicero-Domínguez, 2005). Concerning international trafficking, Mexico’s 
National Immigration Institute is overwhelmed by the sheer number of illegal migrants 
and reports feeling hampered by the government’s policy of immediate deportation, 
which obstructs the institute from thoroughly investigating cases that might be related to 
trafficking (Cicero-Domínguez, 2005). 
Thailand 
Thailand’s illegal economy creates demand for both drugs and victims of human 
trafficking. Despite the illegality, street-level officers are unable to quell either drug or 
human trafficking. Thailand is a destination and transit country for drugs in which 
brothels and pimping illegal with an average Corruption Perceptions Index score of 3.6. 
Consistent with Hypotheses 1 (Drug Trafficking) and 3 (Government Corruption) but 
inconsistent with Hypothesis 2 (Legal Prostitution), it is a destination country for 
prostitution, labor, domestic servitude, child prostitution, and child labor, perhaps due to 
its history of a vast illegal economy. It also experiences internal prostitution trafficking 
and is perceived around the world to provide easy access to sex services (Nuttavuthisit, 
2007). 
The illegal economy was primarily supported by gambling, “followed by 
prostitution, drug trafficking, diesel oil smuggling, trafficking labour, and trading in 
contraband arms” (Phongpaichit, 1999: 3). External gangs such as the Japanese Yakuza 
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operated in Thailand, giving it international significance in both the drug trade and 
human trafficking (Phongpaichit, 1999). 
During the Vietnam War, Thailand and the U.S. military entered into a treaty 
allowing U.S. soldiers to find “Rest and Recreation” in Thailand; this combined with 
increased tourist development increased the sex trade (Nuttavuthisit, 2007: 22). 
Thailand’s efforts to penalize prostitutes’ exploiters or prohibit prostitution itself have 
had little effect in the wake of Thailand’s “branding” as a “haven for sexual adventures” 
in media worldwide (Nuttavuthisit, 2007: 23). Some of the efforts only worsened 
women’s position—under the 1980 policy of 100% condom use, “they suffered the same 
social contempt as always but with additional coercive tactics such as being taken to 
clinics for health checks under police or military escort” (Farley, 2016: 1110). 
Corruption remains a widespread problem. Historically, the networks created by 
criminal groups organized vote-buying or even contested general elections, sometimes 
with the help of policemen who have not only imported and traded drugs but acted as 
“kingpins in human trafficking; and agents and entrepreneurs in the sex services trade” 
(Phongpaichit, 1999: 7). Corruption in law enforcement might be explained by low 
salaries, a superstructure with “too many levels with too little to do,” centralized power, 
no real punishments for wrongdoing, and no outside monitoring (Phongpaichit, 1999: 7). 
In recent efforts against this, Thailand attempted to implement stronger border control, 
international cooperation against drug trafficking, more education for villagers in affected 
areas, and better research methods (U.S. State Department, 2009). Though these efforts 
effectively reduced drug trafficking in the northern border areas, many traffickers simply 
created alternate routes (U.S. State Department, 2009). 
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Connections 
There are some common themes apparent from this selection of case studies. 
First, drug trafficking flows seem to align with human trafficking flows. New Zealand, 
Bangladesh, and Albania are the only exceptions, but the fact that New Zealand (without 
international drug trafficking) is a destination country while Bangladesh and Albania 
(with international drug trafficking) are not can probably be primarily explained by the 
wealth gap between them. As a wealthier nation, New Zealand is appealing to human 
traffickers for reasons besides the lack of drug trafficking resources; as poorer nations, 
Bangladesh and Albania are unappealing regardless of how easy it might be to use 
transiting drug routes to also traffic human victims. Meanwhile, the rest of my cases 
suggest that drug transit and destination countries are also likely to be destination 
countries of human trafficking. Of my 83 countries, only eight (Armenia, Cyprus, 
Liberia, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Saudi Arabia, Slovenia, and Uganda) are destination 
countries without also being either transit or destination countries for drugs. 
Second, in both cases of legalized and criminalized prostitution, creating separate 
zones for prostitution, brothels, and pimping serves to isolate prostitutes and makes 
victims more vulnerable to trafficking. Legalizing prostitution seems to invite human 
traffickers, despite the extra regulation that such legislation may offer. In some cases, the 
regulatory requirements only seem to increase the power imbalance between victims of 
sex trafficking and their exploiters. Increasing the regulations and responsibilities for 
those in charge of sex workers seems only effective when law enforcement has a positive 
view of the sex industry. 
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This connects with the final point concerning corruption. Efforts to combat human 
trafficking ultimately seem to rest with the response of street-level police officers. Less 
corruption and more regulation do not automatically mean that law enforcement correctly 
handles human trafficking. In many cases, police officers attempting to do their jobs only 
harm victims by treating them as criminals. In the United States, laws against illegal 
immigration and prostitution make victims more dependent on traffickers. Mexico’s 
policy of immediate deportation obstructs the government’s ability to investigate 
potential cases of trafficking Decriminalizing prostitution in New Zealand allows officers 
to respond to violence but does not necessarily enable them to prevent violence. Law 
enforcement seems to be most effective in Uruguay, with an intentional focus on 
organized crime and drug trafficking and a history of responsiveness to the complaints of 
prostitutes.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: CONCLUSION 
International human trafficking is a complex problem, affected by factors of the 
international system (globalization, porous borders, international laws, other forms of 
illicit trafficking) as well as domestic variables (laws, wealth, country fragility). Those 
interested in battling international human trafficking should consider taking slightly 
different approaches depending on whether a country is a destination, transit, or source 
country of trafficking. Some factors that appeal to traffickers must simply be accepted: 
for instance, no policymaker would attempt to lower GDP or reduce tourism. Some, such 
as drug trafficking and corruption, are undesirable regardless of their connection to 
human trafficking. Other factors are more nuanced: the opposite effects of legalizing 
brothels and legalizing pimping invites more research on the effects of legalizing 
prostitution on human trafficking. 
My research found support for Hypothesis 1, that drug trafficking flows mirror 
human trafficking flows. Though source countries for drug trafficking are unlikely to be 
destination countries for human trafficking, transit and destination countries for drugs are 
likely to be destination countries for human trafficking. This is likely because criminal 
organizations can easily use the same resources used for drug trafficking to increase their 
profits by also trafficking human victims. Furthermore, the inflow of drugs encourages 
market demands for illicit goods. 
I found some support for Hypotheses 2, that legalizing prostitution makes 
countries more likely to be destination countries. Legal brothels make countries more 
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likely to be destination countries for child prostitution but less likely to be destination 
countries for debt bondage while legal pimping make countries more likely to be 
destination countries for domestic servitude and less likely to be destination countries for 
debt bondage. The variance in substantive impact, however, supports my hypothesis 
overall as the impact of effects that align with my hypothesis are larger than the impact of 
effects that are inconsistent. My research also found that isolating prostitutes 
(geographically, socially, or legally) seems to encourage trafficking by causing victims to 
be unable or willing to find help. 
I found limited support for Hypothesis 3, that corruption makes countries more 
likely to be destination country. My measure of corruption was only significant in one 
model where higher levels of corruption made a country less likely to be a destination 
country for domestic servitude. I expect this is mostly due to measurement error, but it 
suggests that researchers should not assume that corruption has the same effect at all 
levels and in all branches of government; nor should researchers assume that corruption 
has the same effect in destination, source, and transit countries. My research also found 
that effective law enforcement is only helpful to victims of human trafficking if 
individual officers are willing to see individuals as potential victims rather than only as 
perpetrators of certain crimes (such as illegal immigration or prostitution). 
Further research should pursue several goals. First, human trafficking still suffers 
from a lack of data valid across different countries and through time. Related variables, 
such as corruption and criminal organizations, could also be refined. Future research 
should use a disaggregated measure of corruption to distinguish between the effects of 
corruption in different levels and branches of government. Future research could also use 
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rates of drug trafficking, rather than merely trafficking flows, and consider other 
measures of criminal organizations such as weapons trafficking. 
Second, more precise definitions would clarify the issues. For instance, 
researchers should clearly explain what types of human trafficking they are investigating: 
destination, transit, source, or internal, and prostitution, labor, debt bondage, domestic 
servitude, child prostitution, or child labor. They should not assume that because a 
variable has a certain impact on trafficking from source countries that it will have a 
similar impact on trafficking to destination countries or through transit countries; more 
research that distinguishes between countries playing different roles in the international 
network of trafficking will result in a more comprehensive picture of trafficking overall. 
Researchers should also clarify whether they are approaching the issue from the 
perspective of victims or of traffickers and select and organize appropriate variables 
accordingly. 
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Robustness Test Results 
Probit Analysis Results with Prostitution 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 
General 
Dest 
Pros 
Dest 
Labor 
Dest 
Debt 
Bondage 
Dest 
Domestic 
Servitude 
Dest 
Child 
Prostitute 
Dest 
Child 
Labor 
Dest 
Drug 
Destination  1.576*** 0.728** 0.0394 0.520* 0.229 0.154 0.217 
 (3.65) (2.3) &0.23) (2.34) (1.25) (0.89) (1.31) 
Drug 
Transit 
0.140 0.281 
0.332* -0.840*** 0.464* 0.551*** 0.432** 
 (0.67) (1.45) (1.97) (-4.20) (2.33) (3.40) (2.70) 
Drug 
Source -0.802*** -0.680** -0.816*** -0.0760 -0.310 -0.299 -0.663*** 
 (-3.50) (-3.23) (-4.03) (-0.29) (-1.37) (-1.63) (-3.39) 
Brothel 0.285* 0.365** 0.255* -4.008*** 0.529*** 0.511*** 0.102 
 (2.04) (3.00) (2.44) (-9.04) (4.33) (4.60) (0.99) 
Pimping -0.517** -0.469** -0.427** 4.308*** -0.964*** -0.512*** -0.418** 
 (-2.88) (-2.94) (-3.10) (9.92) (-4.47) (-3.31) (-2.86) 
Prostitution -0.126 -0.186 -0.111 -0.376* -0.491*** -0.304** -0.155 
 (-1.06) (-1.67) (-1.12) (-2.45) (-3.85) (-3.18) (-1.69) 
CPI 0.137 0.0584 0.0628 0.0824 0.277*** -0.0121 -0.00660 
 (1.59) (0.85) (0.99) (1.03) (3.30) (-0.20) (-0.11) 
Polity 0.0937*** 0.0851*** 0.0533** 0.0358 -0.0121 0.0596** 0.0890*** 
 (4.06) (3.64) (2.61) (1.19) (-0.42) (3.04) (3.77) 
Domestic 
Laws  
0.280 
0.346* 0.612** -0.237 0.0593 0.318* 0.196 
 (1.41) (1.98) (3.90) (-1.07) (0.32) (2.24) (1.38) 
Enforce -0.0973 -0.0686 -0.627*** -0.221 -0.228 0.251 -0.221 
 (-0.58) (-0.45) (-4.23) (-1.10) (-1.45) (1.85) (-1.58) 
Infant 
Mortality 0.00325 0.00577 0.0160** -0.00988 0.00994 0.0134* 0.0216*** 
 (0.56) (1.07) (2.73) (-1.21) (1.34) (2.36) (3.87) 
Tourism 0.327*** 0.296*** 0.503*** 0.192* 0.207** 0.171** 0.346*** 
 (4.58) (4.16) (7.05) (2.01) (2.87) (3.06) (5.58) 
Security 0.0934 0.00893 0.0944 0.0726 0.0834 -0.0490 0.132* 
 (1.24) (0.14) (1.63) (0.87) (0.96) (-0.87) (2.35) 
Elites 0.00728 0.00862 0.00125 0.00758 -0.0476 0.00327 -0.000768 
 (0.75) (0.81) (0.11) (0.75) (-0.50) (0.29) (-0.06) 
Constant -7.885*** -6.906*** -11.83*** -4.958* -6.844*** -4.815*** -9.327*** 
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 (-4.82) (-4.25) (-7.39) (-2.42) (-4.47) (-3.71) (-6.43) 
N 411 411 411 411 411 411 411 
t statistics in parentheses      
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001     
 
Probit Analysis Results with Landlocked 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 
General 
Dest 
Pros 
Dest 
Labor 
Dest 
Debt 
Bondage 
Dest 
Domestic 
Servitude 
Dest 
Child 
Prostitute 
Dest 
Child 
Labor 
Dest 
Drug 
Destination  1.614*** 0.749** 0.0628 0.474* 0.319 0.248 0.257 
 (3.73) (2.84) (0.37) (2.07) (1.72) (1.47) (1.54) 
Drug 
Transit 
 
0.162 
 
0.292 0.287 -0.857*** 0.418* 0.494** 0.400** 
 (0.74) (1.47) (1.66) (-4.28) (2.19) (3.02) (2.45) 
Drug 
Source -0.774*** -0.620** -0.794*** 0.0521 -0.110 -0.219 -0.616*** 
 (-3.38) (-3.03) (-4.07) (0.21) (-0.51) (-1.23) (-3.30) 
Brothel 0.223 0.265* 0.181 -4.148*** 0.313** 0.369*** 0.0228 
 (1.72) (2.38) (1.88) (-10.63) (3.15) (3.86) (0.24) 
Pimping -0.494** -0.433** -0.415** 4.286*** -0.894*** -0.525*** -0.428** 
 (-2.79) (-2.78) (-3.06) (10.54) (-4.36) (-3.63) (-2.98) 
CPI 0.135 0.0545 0.0511 0.0796 0.271*** -0.0261 -0.00679 
 (1.60) (0.79) (0.81) (0.98) (3.55) (-0.43) (-0.11) 
Landlocked -0.0344 -0.148 -0.377 -0.600 -0.487* -0.835*** -0.621** 
 (-0.12) (-0.63) (-1.72) (-1.83) (-2.04) (-3.90) (-2.909) 
Polity 0.0838*** 0.0685** 0.0424* -0.00405 -0.0478 0.0315 0.0737*** 
 (3.80) (3.06) (2.20) (-0.16) (-1.85) (1.74) (3.46) 
Domestic 
Laws  
 
0.310 0.369* 0.604*** -0.237 0.0478 0.329844* 0.171 
 (1.51) (2.08) (3.82) (-1.08) (0.27) (2.09) (1.20) 
Enforce -0.0973 -0.0456 -0.519*** -0.109 -0.186 0.307* -0.185 
 (-0.57) (-0.29) (-3.98) (-0.57) (-1.21) (2.26) (-1.31) 
Infant 
Mortality 0.00410 0.00747 0.0173** -0.00366 0.0150* 0.0178** 0.0243*** 
 (0.70) (1.37) (2.89) (-0.48) (2.08) (2.91) (4.12) 
Tourism 0.327*** 0.290*** 0.489*** 0.193* 0.0150* 0.1.36* 0.320*** 
 (4.42) (4.05) (6.75) (1.92) (2.08) (2.91) (5.02) 
Security 0.0930 0.00196 0.0755 0.0383 0.0525 -0.0967 0.105* 
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 (1.26) (0.03) (1.27) (0.43) (0.59) (-1.66) (1.84) 
Elites 0.00730 0.00923 0.00371 0.0116 -0.0326 0.00924 0.00310 
 (0.77) (0.89) (0.34) (1.12) (-0.38) (0.85) (0.27) 
Constant -8.036*** 
-
6.931*** -11.40*** -5.115*** -6.794*** -3.935*** -8.695 *** 
 (-4.66) (-4.12) (-6.99) (-2.39) (-4.52) (-2.90) (-5.75) 
N 411 411 411 411 411 411 411 
t statistics in parentheses      
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001     
 
 
Probit Analysis Results with Resource Rents 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 
General 
Dest 
Pros 
Dest 
Labor 
Dest 
Debt 
Bondage 
Dest 
Domestic 
Servitude 
Dest 
Child 
Prostitute 
Dest 
Child 
Labor 
Dest 
Drug 
Destination  1.651*** 0.716** 0.00448 0.479* 0.230 0.165 0.197 
 (3.71) (2.70) (0.03) (2.09) (1.20) (0.97) (1.20) 
Drug 
Transit 
0.208 0.362 
0.366* -0.778*** 0.506** 0.587*** 0.471** 
 (0.96) (1.86) (2.12) (-3.76) (2.70) (3.57) (2.88) 
Drug 
Source -0.800*** -0.652** -0.786*** 0.0916 -0.0750 -0.215 -0.624*** 
 (-3.50) (-3.12) (-4.06) (0.37) (-0.34) (-1.24) (-3.33) 
Brothel 0.201 0.269* 0.208* -4.189*** 0.366*** 0.392*** 0.0477 
 (1.50) (2.43) (2.15) (-10.91) (3.78) (3.98) (0.48) 
Pimping -0.38* -0.394* -0.386** 4.357*** -0.966*** -0.467** -0.401** 
 (-2.48) (-2.49) (-2.79) (10.83) (-4.56) (-3.10) (-2.73) 
CPI 0.142 0.0598 0.05332 0.0979 0.278*** -0.0110 -0.00877 
 (1.65) (0.87) (0.84) (1.24) (3.59) (-0.18) (-0.15) 
Resource 
Rents 0.0231* 0.0200* 0.0288** -0.000140 0.0332** 0.0151 0.0273** 
 (2.55) (2.13) (3.08) (-0.01) (3.03) (1.62) (2.63) 
Polity 0.101*** 0.0871*** 0.0639** -0.000159 -0.0203 0.0469* 0.103*** 
 (4.39) (3.96) (3.11) (-0.00) (-0.69) (2.51) (4.10) 
Domestic 
Laws  
0.272 
0.347* 0.587*** -0.250 0.0903 0.319* 0.185 
 (1.38) (1.99) (3.76) (-1.12) (0.50) (2.20) (1.31) 
Enforce -0.0271 0.00642 -0.542*** -0.168 -0.116 0.306* -0.134 
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 (-0.16) (0.04) (-3.60) (-0.83) (-0.72) (2.21) (-0.94) 
Infant 
Mortality -0.00269 0.00217 0.00888 -0.00452 0.00622 0.0124* 0.0165** 
 (-0.46) (0.37) (1.48) (-0.55) (0.83) (2.07) (2.60) 
Tourism 0.330*** 0.300*** 0.515*** 0.225* 0.242*** 0.181** 0.361*** 
 (4.61) (4.27) (7.18) (2.18) (3.40) (3.25) (5.71) 
Security 0.107 0.0150 0.102 0.0663 0.0799 -0.0469 0.143* 
 (1.40) (0.23) (1.75) (0.76) (0.92) (-0.84) (2.50) 
Elites 0.0108 0.0117 0.00474 0.0103 -0.0330 0.00633 0.00320 
 (1.11) (1.10) (0.43) (1.04) (-0.38) (0.54) (0.2) 
Constant --8.396*** -7.403*** -12.44*** -6.099** -8.447*** -5.535*** -10.21*** 
 (-5.010 (-4.58) (-7.64) (-2.97) (-5.37) (-4.28) (-6.78) 
N 411 411 411 411 411 411 411 
t statistics in parentheses      
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001     
 
Probit Analysis Results with Women in Parliament 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 
General 
Dest 
Pros 
Dest 
Labor 
Dest 
Debt 
Bondage 
Dest 
Domestic 
Servitude 
Dest 
Child 
Prostitute 
Dest 
Child 
Labor 
Dest 
Drug 
Destination  1.665*** 0.773** 0.0286 0.525* 0.349 0.188 0.206 
 (3.74) (2.77) (0.16) (2.22) (1.86) (1.08) (1.26) 
Drug 
Transit 
0.105 0.272 
0.309 -0.592** 0.502* 0.500** 0.389* 
 (0.48) (1.32) (1.77) (-2.97) (2.50) (2.95) (2.36) 
Drug 
Source -0.673** -0.589** -0.713*** -0.101 -1.0923 -0.0697 -0.432* 
 (-2.96) (-2.88) (-3.70) (-0.42) (-0.44) (-0.38) (-2.37) 
Brothel 0.239 0.252* 0.219* -5.249*** 0.352*** 0.410*** 0.0703 
 (1.80) (2.24) (2.15) (-11.89) (3.35) (3.78) (0.71) 
Pimping -0.505** -0.433** -0.433** 5.446*** -0.844*** -0.525*** -0.430** 
 (-2.71) (2.65) (-3.05) (11.61) (-4.05) (-3.36) (-2.97) 
CPI 0.0728 0.0299 0.0333 0.354*** -0.525*** -0.430**  
(2.71) (-2.65) (-3.05) (11.61) (-4.05) (-3.36) (-2.97)  
Polity 0.105*** 0.0872** 0.0645** 0.0660 -0.0529 0.0174 0.0702** 
 (3.70) (3.11) (2.73) (1.76) (-1.91) (0.71) (2.75) 
Domestic 
Laws  
0.332 
0.388* 0.632*** -0.370 0.0767 0.371** 0.242 
 (1.65) (2.22) (4.05) (-1.51) (0.43) (2.59) (1.71) 
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Enforce -0.107 -0.0491 -0.624*** -0.133 -0.249 0.335* -0.202 
 (-0.62) (-0.31) (-4.18) (-0.71) (-1.61) (2.46) (-1.45) 
Infant 
Mortality 0.00122 0.00377 0.0149* -0.00297 0.0173* 0.0127* 0.0220*** 
 (0.20) (0.68) (2.48) (-0.36) (2.33) (2.25) (3.84) 
Women in 
parliament 0.00334 0.00997 0.00647 0.000123 -0.0115 0.0127* 0.0220*** 
 (0.37) (1.22) (0.85) (0.01) (-1.23) (0.86) (0.63) 
Tourism 0.294*** 0.279*** 0.488*** 0.252* 0.209** 0.134* 0.329*** 
 (3.88) (3.80) (6.76) (2.17) (3.02) (2.28) (5.11) 
Constant -7.053*** -7.028*** -11.81*** -10.19*** -7.051*** -3.137* -8.025*** 
 (-3.37) (-3.73) (-6.55) (-3.66) (-4.02) (-2.02) (-4.91) 
N 411 411 411 411 411 411 411 
t statistics in parentheses      
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001     
 
Probit Analysis Results with Percent of the Population Male over 60 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 
General 
Dest 
Pros 
Dest 
Labor 
Dest 
Debt 
Bondage 
Dest 
Domestic 
Servitude 
Dest 
Child 
Prostitute 
Dest 
Child 
Labor 
Dest 
Drug 
Destination  1.691*** 0.748** 0.0572 0.505* 0.379* 0.189 0.236 
 (4.12) (2.80) (0.34) (2.20) (2.06) (1.11) (1.43) 
Drug 
Transit 
0.234 0.340 
0.346* -0.768*** 0.636 0.575*** 0.437** 
 (1.09) (1.76) (2.05) (-3.77) (1.92) (3.53) (2.71) 
Drug 
Source -0.831*** -0.644** -0.768*** -0.00368 -0.216 -0.198 -0.567** 
 (-3.63) (-3.12) (-3.98) (-0.02) (-0.99) (-1.13) (-3.07) 
Brothel 0.175 0.255* 0.223* -4.775*** 0.215* 0.402*** 0.0791 
 (1.33) (2.27) (2.25) (-11.70) (2.04) (3.85) (0.80) 
Pimping -0.44* -0.401* -0.430** 4.951*** -0.742*** -0.501** -0.477** 
 (-2.36) (-2.50) (-3.08) (11.56) (-3.45) (-3.23) (-3.16) 
CPI 0.178* 0.0718 0.0593 0.136 0.306*** -0.0109 -0.0189 
 (2.04) (1.03) (0.94) (1.65) (3.90) (-0.18) (-0.31) 
Polity 0.0942*** 0.0736** 0.0435* 0.0153 -0.0306 0.0336 0.0694** 
 (4.17) (3.22) (2.22) (0.57) (-1.15) (1.81) (3.15) 
Domestic 
Laws  
0.217 
0.346 0.637*** -0.279 -0.00306 0.356* 0.264 
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 (1.06) (1.93) (4.01) (-1.26) (-0.02) (2.51) (1.80) 
Enforce -0.0445 -0.0331 -0.633*** -0.108 -0.121 0.252 -0.252 
 (-0.26) (-0.21) (-4.18) (-0.55) (-0.77) (1.83) (-1.76) 
Infant 
Mortality 0.000727 0.00530 0.0180** -0.0125 0.00554 0.0176** 0.0263*** 
 (0.12) (0.95) (2.95) (-1.51) (0.61) (2.97) (4.30) 
Male 60 -0.0351* -0.0183 0.00938 -0.0621* 
-
0.0834*** 0.0129 0.0300* 
 (-2.08) (-1.53) (0.75) (-2.29) (-4.01) (1.04) (2.08) 
Tourism 0.330*** 0.296*** 0.505*** 0.243* 0.232** 0.174** 0.342*** 
 (4.61) (4.21) (7.05) (2.23) (3.19) (3.08) (5.39) 
Security 0.0884 -0.000397 0.0893 0.0478 0.0959 -0.0423 0.143* 
 (1.17) (-0.01) (1.69) (0.56) (1.13) (-0.77) (0.10) 
Elites 0.00725 0.00843 0.00159 0.00783 -0.115 0.00458 0.00117 
 (0.75) (0.81) (0.15) (0.79) (-1.29) (0.39) (0.10) 
Constant -7.799*** -6.936*** -12.14*** -5.848** -6.601*** -5.428*** -9.820*** 
 (-4.66) (-4.27) (7.48) (-2.68) (4.24) (-4.17) (-6.56) 
N 411 411 411 411 411 411 411 
t statistics in parentheses      
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001     
 
Probit Analysis Results with Unemployment Rates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 
General 
Dest 
Pros 
Dest 
Labor 
Dest 
Debt 
Bondage 
Dest 
Domestic 
Servitude 
Dest 
Child 
Prostitute 
Dest 
Child 
Labor 
Dest 
Drug 
Destination  1.626*** 0.767** 0.0411 0.344 0.295 0.189 0.230 
 (3.73) (2.82) (0.24) (1.42) (1.59) (1.11) (1.39) 
Drug 
Transit 
0.170 0.323 
0.352* -0.860*** 0.387* 0.575*** 0.428** 
 (0.80) (1.69) (2.09) (-4.25) (2.10) (3.54) (2.68) 
Drug 
Source -0.774*** -0.626** -0.826*** 0.0402 -0.119 -0.218 -0.609** 
 (-3.39) (-3.06( (-4.13) (0.15) (-0.58) (-1.24) (-3.24) 
Brothel 0.232 0.266* 0.236* -4.248*** 0.326** 0.399*** 0.0651 
 (1.78) (2.39) (2.42) (-10.15) (3.28) (3.92) (0.67) 
Pimping -0.489** -0.451** -0.385** 4.459*** -0.873*** -0.470** -0.410** 
 (-2.78) (-2.89) (-2.77) (9.94) (-4.22) (-3.13) (-2.84) 
CPI 0.144 0.0415 0.108 0.123 0.273*** 0.00826 0.0208 
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 (1.64) (0.50) (1.76) (1.44) (3.59) (0.14) (0.34) 
Polity 0.0828*** 0.0745** 0.0349 -0.0170 -0.0533* 0.0331 0.0722** 
 (3.71) (3.26) (1.80) (-0.65) (-1.97) (1.77) (3.25) 
Domestic 
Laws  
0.303 
0.408* 0.605*** -0.191 0.0802 0.325* -0.187 
 (1.50) (2.33) (3.81) (-0.86) (0.46) (2.30) (1.32) 
Enforce -0.0.891 -0.0984 -0.567*** -0.193 -0.207 0.288* -0.187 
 (0.52) (-0.64) (3.80) -0.87) (-1.33) (2.09( (1.33) 
Infant 
Mortality 0.00469 0.00597 0.0194** -0.00998 0.0136 00171** 0.0244*** 
 (0.75) (1.11) (3.25) (-1.30) (1.80) (2.91) (4.30) 
Tourism 0.329*** 0.302*** 0.506*** 0.258* 0.204** 0.172** 0.342*** 
 (4.61) (4.24) (6.87) (2.35) (2.96) (3.08) (5.44) 
Unemploy-
ment 0.00894 -0.0266 0.0599** 0.0746** 0.0293 0.0233 0.0407* 
 (0.35) (-1.39) (3.14) (3.13) (1.36) (1.21) (2.57) 
Security 0.0970 0.00295 0.108 0.0581 0.0798 -0.473 0.135* 
 (1.30) (0.0) (1.85) (0.62) (0.93) (-0.85) (2.39) 
Elites 0.00676 0.00951 -0.0012 0.00944 -0.0593 0.00316 -0.00169 
 (0.70) (0.91) (-0.11) (0.93) (-0.68) (0.27) (-0.14) 
Constant -8.225*** -6.959*** -12.77*** -7.277*** -7.244*** -5.464*** -9.845*** 
 (-4.82) (-4.25) (-7.39) (-2.42) (-4.47) (-3.71) (-6.43) 
N 411 411 411 411 411 411 411 
t statistics in parentheses      
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001     
 
 
